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Anti-entrenchment rules prevent governments from passing unrepealable
legislation and ensure that subsequent governments are free to revisit the policy choices
of the past. However, governments-and local governments in particular-have become
increasingly adept at using private law mechanisms like contracts and property
conveyances to make binding precommitments into the future. Simultaneously, courts
and state legislatures in recent years have reduced the availability of core de-entrenching
tools, like eminent domain, that have traditionally allowed governments to recapture
policymaking authority from the past. These changes threaten to shift democratic power
intertemporally. This Article develops a typology of mechanisms for public
entrenchment through private law and private rights; as well as core anti-entrenchment
protections embedded in the law. It then develops a framework for evaluating
entrenchment concerns, comparing the costs of decreased flexibility against the benefits
of increased reliance. Viewed through this framework, some recent changes in the law
appear particularly problematic, from restrictions on eminent domain, to the rise of
development rights, and creative forms of municipal finance like selling assets instead of
incurring debt.
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In a democracy, governments are not allowed to bind future
governments.' Ordinary legislation cannot be made unrepealable, and
future governments are free to revisit the policy choices of their
predecessors.2 The prohibition against entrenchment, as it is called in
the academic literature, is meant to ensure that each government can
be democratically responsive to its own electorate and is not bound by
the preferences of the past.! In fact, however, exceptions are
widespread.! This Article identifies and examines an increasingly
important mechanism for propelling policy into the future, anti-
entrenchment rules notwithstanding: governments' use of private law
and private rights to make binding intertemporal precommitments.
At its heart, the prohibition on entrenchment implicates the very
reach of government power and the nature of democratic
accountability.' Analyzing entrenchment purely as a matter of political
theory, however, misses an important legal dimension to the topic. This
Article argues that entrenchment through private law and private
rights is actually commonplace, that it is subject to certain structural
protections that preserve flexibility for future governments, but that
recent changes-like limits on eminent domain-threaten to tip the
1 See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 379,381-82,391-93.
2 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
111 Yale L J 1665,1667 (2002) (defining entrenchment).
3 A separate, but equally robust, justification for anti-entrenchment rules applies to a
parliamentary system. In England, the absolute power of the sovereign requires that no
sovereign can be bound by the decisions of a previous sovereign. See, for example, Eule,
1987 Am Bar Found Rsrch J at 392 (cited in note 1) ("If Parliament is to remain supreme, it must
necessarily retain the power to make or unmake any law.").
4 Examples from the literature include bicameralism, staggered-term agency
appointments, and the Constitution itself. See William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, The
Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Georgetown L J 523,528 (1992) (discussing bicameralism); Richard
J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the
Future, 94 Cornell L Rev 1153, 1213 (2009) (identifying staggered-term appointments as a
mechanism for reducing political responsiveness of agency officials); Michael C. Dorf, The
Aspirational Constitution, 77 Geo Wash L Rev 1631, 1631 (2009) ("[A] constitution burdens
rather than benefits future generations by limiting their political freedom to choose policies that,
in their judgment, best serve their interests."); Tom Ginsburg and Eric A. Posner,
Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan L Rev 1583, 1586 (2010) ("[I]deas of entrenchment are central to
the notion of constitutions.").
5 Thomas Jefferson, for example, was deeply concerned with the limits of a government's
ability to constrain future governments. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Sept 6, 1789), reprinted in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 5 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 115,
121-22 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895); Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent
Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U Chi Legal F 295, 295 n 2. See also
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U Chi L Rev 247, 254 (2007) (citing and describing
Jefferson's views that constitutions should sunset every generation).
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scales of an often hidden but otherwise carefully balanced equilibrium
between stability and flexibility. This Article ultimately proposes a
utilitarian calculus for evaluating the appropriateness of
entrenchment in any given context, balancing the benefits of private
parties' reliance on government precommitments against the costs of
reduced flexibility in the future. The additional complexity is
institutional: the calculation occurs in a context in which governments
are likely to discount, if not ignore, the costs to the future. Simply
recognizing the functional tradeoff highlights the importance of
procedural and substantive protections to safeguard the future from
policy preferences of the past.
Private law provides governments, and local governments in
particular, with a number of legal tools that functionally approximate
unrepealable legislation. To take just three examples from the many
that follow, entering into a long-term public-private partnership can
bind future governments to the terms of a contract,' conveying
servitudes like conservation easements can entrench a conservation
agenda,' and using tax increment financing to fund public
infrastructure can commit a local government to predetermined
spending priorities far into the future.! Once the problem of
entrenchment is expanded to include private law mechanisms, formal
anti-entrenchment rules migrate to one end of a much broader
spectrum.' The breadth of that spectrum reveals that the problem of
entrenchment is both more ubiquitous and more varied than people
have generally acknowledged.o
This Article therefore first develops a typology of the ways in
which a government can use private law or operate through private
actors to entrench a particular policy, agenda, or set of priorities." The
broad forms include contractual entrenchment (entering into long-
term procurement contracts or development agreements), property
entrenchment (alienating resources or creating vested rights),
financial entrenchment (incurring debt or setting future spending
6 See Part II.A.2.
7 See Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation Easements
over Public Land, 77 U Chi L Rev 341,343-45 (2010).
8 See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political
Economy of Local Government, 77 U Chi L Rev 65,67-69 (2010).
9 For an argument that entrenchment exists on a spectrum, see Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev
at 366 (cited in note 7).
1o For a notable exception, see Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1700-03 (cited in
note 2) (arguing that many different government actions are entrenching).
11 I use the term "typology" for all of the excellent reasons discussed by Fred Bloom. See
Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost & Found, 100 Cal L Rev *24 n 161, *34 n 213 (forthcoming
2011) (on file with author).
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priorities), and physical entrenchment (permitting either the
development or destruction of resources that limit policy options in
the future). In its descriptive sections, this Article defines these
various forms of entrenchment and, equally important, provides real-
world examples of each.
These forms of entrenchment are also subject to certain
protections that prevent government precommitments from binding
future governments too tightly. So while a sophisticated property
conveyance can in fact entrench a conservation agenda by relying on
background private law rules, the public trust doctrine limits what the
government can convey away at the outset, and the availability of
eminent domain can give a subsequent government the opportunity to
change course later. As it turns out, the forms of entrenchment
identified in this Article usually exist in remarkable equipoise with
these and a number of other anti-entrenchment doctrines.
That, however, is changing. In recent decades, local governments
in particular have become more creative at finding ways to entrench
their policy decisions." Simultaneously, anti-entrenchment protection
has been scaled back, creating more opportunities for government
lock-in." People's failure even to recognize the entrenchment
problems that these changes create means that the law is shifting
quickly out of balance.
Eminent domain provides the most obvious example. In response
to concerns about perceived condemnation abuse, many states have
recently adopted eminent domain reform, curtailing -sometimes in
dramatic fashion-the ability of governments to take property for
public use." The debate over such reforms has focused almost entirely
on the appropriate expansion or limitation of property rights." This
Article argues, however, that eminent domain serves another
important purpose. In addition to its traditional role in facilitating
land acquisition-and reasonable minds can disagree about how
12 See Part II.
13 See Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
14 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo,
93 Minn L Rev 2100,2114-20 (2009) (reviewing state responses).
15 See, for example, Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory
Taking's Anti-subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 Ind L Rev 97,
98-99 (2009) ("At the core of the opposition [to eminent domain] are earnest and deeply held
beliefs about individual property rights."); Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for
Local Planners and Developers, 22 Ga St U L Rev 803, 803 (2006) ("Justice O'Connor's
hyperbolic dissent inflamed property rights advocates, media pundits, and state and federal
legislators, who assailed Kelo as the death knell for private property rights."); Julia D. Mahoney,
Kelos Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 S Ct Rev 103, 105
("[T]he legacy of Kelo could be inadequate or even counterproductive protections of property
rights.").
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robust that role should be-eminent domain is an essential tool for
buying back control over choices made by earlier governments. This
may explain why property rights, uniquely among constitutionally
protected interests, receive only liability rule protection. 6 Ignoring this
role of eminent domain impoverishes the debate over its appropriate
limits and allows courts and legislatures to restrict its use more than
they should.
Arguing that some government actions have become too
entrenching requires a way of evaluating how binding governments'
private law precommitments should be. There is no real mystery why
government actors may want to tie the hands of future governments.
A government might be able to induce a private party to provide
some service- cleaning up an environmental spill, building a prison,
providing affordable housing-in exchange for favorable regulatory
treatment in the future." That bargain may be struck only if the
government can make its reciprocal promise binding. Or, under an
optimistic vision of public decisionmaking, if a government identifies
what it views as good policy, then it may try to lock it in to prevent
political mischief from subverting that policy in the future.'8
Under a less optimistic view of the government, however,
entrenched policies are more likely themselves to be the result of
special-interest-group rent-seeking." Moreover, entrenchment creates
opportunities for intertemporal agency problems as governments
impose costs on the future in exchange for immediate gains. This
Article's normative sections therefore examine, in general form, the
principal reasons for entrenchment and the central problems that it
presents. Fundamentally, entrenchment creates benefits from reliance
on government precommitments, but it creates a risk that a
government will trade off future flexibility for short-term gains.
This analysis is deeply intertwined with the nature of the political
process and with likely political failures. To narrow the discussion to a
manageable size-if still just barely-this Article addresses
16 Theorists have struggled with the question why property rights are not protected like
other interests in the Bill of Rights. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 15-18 (Harvard 1985) (arguing that property rights
should be treated like other constitutionally protected rights); C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its
Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U Pa L Rev 741, 782-85 (1986) (arguing the
opposite). Perhaps they are not inferior rights but must simply give way to the structural role of
eminent domain in preserving future governments' flexibility.
17 For two such examples, see note 267.
18 See McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 295 (cited in note 5) ("Lawmakers always have
dreamed of making their decisions irrevocable.").
19 See Daniel R. Fischel and Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
1 Am L & Econ Rev 313,316 (1999).
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entrenchment primarily in local governments. This diverges notably
from previous academic work on the subject, which has focused
almost entirely on legislative entrenchment at the state or, more often,
the federal level.20 In much of the previous academic writing, the
principal hypothetical driving the analysis is Congress entrenching the
death penalty or abortion policy.21 In contrast, the examples here
involve precommitments concerning land use, funding for municipal
services, or municipal debt. While these may be less dramatic (and
admittedly less fraught) examples than abortion or the death penalty,
they are also commonplace and therefore of more than theoretical
significance.
Part I defines entrenchment and sets out the scope of the project.
Part II identifies the conceptual sources of entrenchment in private
law and provides real-world examples from local governments.
Importantly, it identifies a specific trajectory in the law as
governments have become more adept at finding ways to entrench
their policy decisions and courts have become increasingly willing to
enforce various forms of precommitments. Part III completes the
Article's descriptive analysis, discussing the various forms of
entrenchment protection already existing in the law. Part IV develops
a framework for evaluating entrenchment concerns, identifying
entrenchment's costs and benefits. Part V then proposes a specific
utilitarian calculus for entrenchment and offers some specific policy
prescriptions.
I. ENTRENCHMENT WHAT AND How
Entrenchment affects the ability of a government to respond to
the will of its constituents and therefore implicates core democratic
values.22 Whether it strengthens or weakens them is a matter of
temporal perspective. Allowing a government to decide for itself not
only what policies to adopt but also how binding they will be on the
future is democracy enhancing. It increases the power of a
government to respond to constituents' preferences by adding a
20 See, for example, David Dana and Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Democracy, 148 U Pa L Rev 473, 473-74 (1999); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Georgetown L J 491,496-98 (1997); Eule, 1987 Am Bar
Found Rsrch J at 383 (cited in note 1); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of
Congress to Control the Future, 13 Hastings Const L O 185,188-90 (1986).
21 See, for example, John C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary
Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 Cal L Rev 1773, 1775-76 (2003);
Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 Colum L
Rev 1482, 1494-95 (2007); Heidi S. Alexander, Note, The Theoretic and Democratic Implications
ofAnti-abortion Trigger Laws, 61 Rutgers L Rev 381,392-93 (2009).
22 See note 5.
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temporal component to government decisions." Not only can a
majority decide whether to fund a library, it can also determine library
funding into the future. But it comes with an offsetting loss. Increasing
the power of a government to propel its choices into the future
decreases the power of future governments to decide policy for
themselves. Allocating democratic power intertemporally is therefore
a zero-sum game. The more power the earlier government has to
entrench its decisions, the less power later governments have to make
their own.
Much of the literature on entrenchment operates at this
conceptual level." Theorists of democracy argue about what
entrenchment means for self-determination. Michael McConnell
succinctly sums up the majority perspective: "Future lawmakers have
just as much power to depart from the decisions of their forebears as
their forebears had to make the decisions in the first place."25
McConnell provocatively takes the argument to its logical extreme
and argues that if policy choices are taken away from future
governments, then there is no point bothering with elections at all.26
Doctrinally, this much is clear: core anti-entrenchment rules
prevent governments from passing formally unrepealable legislation.2
In fact, however, governments have many more opportunities to make
binding precommitments than people generally realize (or at least
than people have previously catalogued and categorized). Entering
into contracts, incurring debt, and alienating property all have the
effect of limiting the range of options available to governments in the
future. Indeed, by conscripting private law and private parties,
governments can deploy an array of devices that create
precommitments more binding than public law would ever allow.
2 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1672 (cited in note 2) ("[E]ntrenchment
powers give Congress a more refined tool for controlling [temporal] effects.").
24 See notes 20-21.
25 McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 296 (cited in note 5).
26 See id at 300. McConnell's point is rhetorical but made with great effect in the context of
consent decrees:
The conduct of the executive branch, no less than the legislative, is intended to be politically
accountable. That is why we hold elections for President. If changes in policy have already
been ruled out by binding and irrevocable agreements with private parties, then there is no
point in holding them.
Id.
27 See United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839, 872-73 (1996) (describing entrenchment
doctrine as a "centuries-old concept"); Roberts and Chemerinsky, 91 Cal L Rev at 1775 (cited in
note 21) ("Are [laws that 'flatly prohibit' future repeal] constitutional? The conventional wisdom is
that they are not, because one legislature cannot bind a future legislature."); Klarman,
85 Georgetown L J at 506 (cited in note 20) ("[I]f today's majority enacts a statute, which by its
terms is unrepealable, then it has illegitimately extended its present sovereignty into the future.").
886 [78:879
Public Entrenchment
As insightful as McConnell and others have been about the
problem of entrenchment, they do not provide the tools for deciding
what other kinds of government actions actually run afoul of anti-
entrenchment concerns. This Part defines the scope of the problem. It
sets out a broad definition of entrenchment and explains the Article's
focus on local governments and private law.
A. Defining Entrenchment
The term "entrenchment" is used in various ways in the legal and
political science literature." The narrowest definition includes only
legislation made formally unrepealable by the legislation itself.n This
definition - common in recent legal scholarship-is particularly useful
for distilling the central normative problem with entrenchment in its
strongest form: whether one government can make decisions in a way
that removes the ability of subsequent governments to make different
decisions. It misses, however, functional equivalents of entrenchment
that nevertheless present the same general concern. In ancient Greece,
for example, laws were not formally entrenched in the sense that they
could not be repealed, but the Locrians required that the proponent
of any legal change make his proposal with a noose around his neck.
If the change was voted down, then its advocate would be hanged on
the spot. Not surprisingly, in two hundred years, only one law was ever
changed." Although the Locrian practice did not constitute formal
entrenchment under a narrow definition, the lock-in effect is clear
enough. The literature that focuses only on unrepealable legislation
28 See, for example, Roberts and Chemerinsky, 91 Cal L Rev at 1778 (cited in note 21)
("[Entrenchment] covers both repeal and amendment of earlier legislation."); Posner and
Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1667 (cited in note 2) (defining entrenchment as "statutes or internal
legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same form"); Dana
and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 529 (cited in note 20) (defining entrenchment as "a legal
hierarchy in which the will of a past legislature trumps the will of a present legislature"). Julian
Eule distinguishes between four kinds of entrenchment. See Eule, 1987 Am Bar Found Rsrch J
at 384-85 (cited in note 1). "[A]bsolute entrenchment" exists when "the right of repeal is denied
for all time, under any conditions, and by whatever procedure." Id at 384. "[P]rocedural
entrenchment" involves "an attempt not to bind the future irrevocably, but to prescribe the
'manner and form' by which the promulgated directives can be changed." Id at 384-85.
"[TJransitory entrenchment" prevents "alteration for a specified period of time only," while
"preconditional entrenchment" allows change "only on the occurrence of a preordained event."
Id at 385.
29 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1667 (cited in note 2) (defining entrenchment
to include only this core legislative type of entrenchment).
30 See Melissa Schwartzberg, Athenian Democracy and Legal Change, 98 Am Polit Sci
Rev 311, 322 (2004). Thanks to Saul Zipkin for bringing to my attention this fascinating historical
account.
31 See id (noting that Demosthenes praised the Locrian solution as promoting
unamendable features in their laws).
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can hide the ubiquity of entrenchment concerns and, ironically,
trivialize the fundamental problem.
This Article therefore adopts a broader definition of
entrenchment, one that can include the Greeks' threat of death for
legal reformers and more. As the term is used here, an action is
entrenching to the extent that it limits the policy choices available to
future governments. In principle, this definition is sufficiently broad to
encompass every single act that a government undertakes. Planting a
tree is entrenching if it limits the ability of a government to site a
street lamp. Actions today always affect the options available in the
future, and this definition threatens to make the category of
entrenchment uninteresting in its banality.32 But that is the point.
Sometimes entrenchment is banal. Government decisions always
impact future flexibility. The problem of entrenchment is therefore not
just the problem of unrepealable legislation; it requires wrestling with
the entrenching effect of everything that a government does.
Under this definition, entrenchment always exists on a
continuum. Government actions are always either more or less
entrenching. Formally unrepealable legislation is at one end of the
spectrum." At the other end is planting a tree, passing a road budget,
or undertaking some of the other routine functions of local
governments. Even these have some entrenching effect, as they alter
the preexisting regulatory (or physical) landscape. Indeed, the status
quo is entrenching simply because it is the status quo. But
governments can change course through the ordinary political process
or by undertaking relatively trivial de-entrenching actions, like cutting
down the tree.
Recognizing the breadth of the problem changes the question
from whether entrenchment should be allowed in the extreme,
stylized examples that pervade the literature to a more nuanced and,
32 Some might wonder why this Article retains the word "entrenchment" to refer to such a
broad category. Little turns on the name. It could just as easily be termed "removal of future
flexibility." The reason to retain the term is simply to invoke the sophisticated extant literature
on entrenchment, which has fleshed out the same underlying concerns.
33 Even this is not entirely immutable; revolution or other dissolution of the government
can still wipe the slate clean.
34 See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Georgetown L
J 2025,2067 (1999) ("The status quo achieves a kind of presumption or priority simply because it
is the status quo. In this way, too, our current actions can reach into the future, and even into the
next generation."); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U
Chi L Rev 361, 406 (2004) ("[I1t may be more difficult for the legislative majority to repeal an
earlier minoritarian enactment than it would have been to vote it down in the first instance, even
if the enactment has only been law for a brief period."). See also Russell Korobkin, The
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw U L Rev 1227, 1236 (2003) ("[I]ndividuals tend to
prefer the status quo state of the world, all other things being equal.").
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frankly, more difficult question: How much entrenchment should be
allowed?" Entrenchment concerns are not restricted to some stylized
(and currently nonexistent) form of formally unrepealable legislation,
but rather are at issue in a broad array of government actions that
have the effect of limiting-more or less-future governments' policy
*16
choices.
The point bears repeating because the rest of this Article hinges on
it: everything that a government does has some effect on the future and
is therefore entrenching, as this Article uses the term. Of course, this
does not mean that every government action is somehow
problematically or impermissibly entrenching. Instead, it demonstrates
the need for a more comprehensive theory of entrenchment that
provides a way of assessing whether the entrenching effects of various
government precommitments go too far-and what protections should
therefore be in place.
B. Local Governments and Private Law
Given this Article's expansive definition of entrenchment, a
comprehensive catalogue of the problem addressing all levels and
branches of government would be truly vast. This Article therefore
concentrates on local governments in order to make the project more
manageable in scope. This focus is atypical in discussions of
entrenchment, which are usually about hot-button national issues.
Nevertheless, local governments have tended to be the most creative
about both making precommitments binding on the future and
escaping earlier governments' precommitments.1
35 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's exchange with John Roberts and Erwin
Chemerinsky focused primarily on the former question: whether entrenchment should be
permissible. Compare Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1666 (cited in note 2) (arguing that
the rule against entrenchment is constitutionally unfounded and is no more objectionable than
many other policy instruments that legislatures use to affect the future), with Roberts and
Chemerinsky, 91 Cal L Rev at 1777 (cited in note 21) (contending that Posner and Vermeule's
argument that entrenchment should be permissible is wrong as a matter of constitutional law
and undesirable as a matter of policy).
36 Michael Klarman distinguishes between the entrenching character of "today's majority
exercising sovereignty over the present in a way that unavoidably affects the future and today's
majority seeking direct control over the future in a manner that is unnecessary to implementing
its complete control over the present." Klarman, 85 Georgetown L J at 505 (cited in note 20).
37 See notes 20-21.
38 This may be true, in part, because local governments lack the ability to precommit
constitutionally. A state, and even the federal government, can entrench its most urgent
precommitments in its constitution. A local government has no such power. Even the content of
municipal charters is not binding on future local governments. See, for example, Williams v City
Council of West Point, 68 Ga 816,816 (1882) ("[O]ne council cannot, by ordinance, bind itself and
its successors to a given line of policy, or prevent free legislation by them in matters of municipal
government."); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-188(a) (setting out a similar limit).
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Local governments are also a particularly useful focus because
their actions are often capitalized into property values, providing
important political feedback that is more direct and easier to detect
than at the state or federal level." Consider, for example, the effect of
a beautiful, privately owned, undeveloped field near some homes. The
presence of the field may increase the value of the neighboring
property to a certain extent, but the risk that the field will eventually
be developed will also be reflected in those property values. That is,
any increase in nearby property values resulting from proximity to the
field is discounted by the likelihood that the field will be developed. If
the field were somehow perpetually conserved, however-if it were a
park or subject to conservation easements-then the value of
neighboring property would increase even more.40 Sometimes, then,
entrenchment serves to capitalize into property values the long-term
effects of government policies and decisions. Beneficial
precommitments will increase property values today, and adverse
precommitments will have the opposite effect. Both come with
immediate political consequences.' This is by no means a perfect
mechanism. It works only to the extent that precommitments are, in
fact, capitalized into property values. Nevertheless, that such a
mechanism exists at all means that the costs and benefits of
entrenchment are presented with particular clarity at the local level.
In addition to entrenchment by local governments, this Article is
also concerned with entrenchment exclusively through private law, or
at least through private actions. As this Article is about law, and not
about political theory or psychology, its focus is on the ways in which
private rights constrain governments. There are, of course, many other
sources of entrenchment that are beyond the scope of this Article, like
the Constitution itself.42 Individual constitutional provisions- notably,
the Takings and Contracts Clauses-are responsible for the
entrenching character of some of the private rights described below,
39 For a discussion of how and why property values apply differently in state and federal
governments, see Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local
Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 NYU L Rev 1624,1661-65 (2006).
4 See, for example, Thomas R. Hammer, Robert E. Coughlin, and Edward T. Horn IV, The
Effect of a Large Urban Park on Real Estate Value, 40 J Am Inst Planners 274, 276-77 (1974)
(studying the effect of parkland on nearby property values); Mark R. Correll, Jane H. Lillydahl,
and Larry D. Singell, The Effects of Greenbelts on Residential Property Values: Some Findings on
the Political Economy of Open Space, 54 Land Econ 207, 211 (1978) (finding that "there is a
$4.20 decrease in the price of a residential property for every foot one moves away from the
[green space]").
41 See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local
Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 39-57 (Harvard 2001).
42 See Dorf, 77 Geo Wash L Rev at 1637-44 (cited in note 4). See also Jeremy Waldron,
Law and Disagreement 258 (Oxford 1999) (describing constitutions as forms of precommitment).
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and individual constitutional provisions are considered in the context
of those specific rights." But the Constitution itself as a form of
entrenchment is a separate topic." Entrenchment can come from
other sources as well, including courts, technological path dependency,
psychological effects, and informal norms.45 The same caveat applies
there as well. Courts, and the inertial quality of the status quo, are
explicitly addressed only insofar as they are responsible for the
entrenching effect of private law precommitments. An entirely
separate treatment would be needed to account for the entrenching
character of other institutions.
This Article also puts aside entrenchment arising purely from
political pressure (though it does consider the political economy of
entrenchment in general and of the various forms of entrenchment
protection). Some actions are entrenching simply because changing
them imposes significant political costs." Undoubtedly, this is an
extremely important category, but it is too broad to be usefully
considered here. Not only does it include obvious sources of political
popularity and unpopularity (whatever the reason), but it also
includes actions by local governments that predictably create special
interest groups mobilized to defend the status quo, like rent control
ordinances47 and, perhaps, historic preservation.4 The category also
includes procedural rules that make change hard. Indeed, Senate
cloture rules are a standard example of entrenchment." The
procedures themselves are theoretically amenable to change through
the ordinary political process, though, so it is political pressure alone
that keeps them in place. These are all very important, but by
reserving them for future research, this Article can focus more closely
43 See Part II.B and text accompanying notes 211-15.
4 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-
Government (Yale 2001). See also Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U Pa L
Rev 1329,1331 n 3 (2010) (citing sources).
45 See Clayton P Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813, 817-21
(1998) (considering the various sources of lock-in); see generally LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism,
158 U Pa L Rev 1329 (cited in note 44) (discussing the temporal reach of judicial decisions).
46 See Vermeule, 71 U Chi L Rev at 406 (cited in note 34). See also Posner and Vermeule,
111 Yale L J at 1696-97 (cited in note 2).
47 See, for example, Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake: George Pataki, Market Ideology,
and the Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 Fordham Urban L J 339,363-4,
389-91 (2004).
48 See Alexander J. Reichl, Historic Preservation and Progrowth Politics in US Cities,
32 Urban Aff Rev 513, 516-19 (1997).
49 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1694 (cited in note 2). See also
Tom Udall, The Constitutional Option: Reforming the Rules of the Senate to Restore
Accountability and Reduce Gridlock, Harv L & Pol Rev (Jan 9, 2011), online at
http://hlpronline.com/2011/01/the-constitutional-option-reforming-the-rules-of-the-senate-to-restore-
accountability-and-reduce-gridlock/ (visited Feb 11,2011).
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on local government actions that rely on private law (or private
conduct) to constrain the future.
II. SOURCES OF ENTRENCHMENT
Government entrenchment through private law takes many
forms. This Part introduces and catalogues the primary sources of
entrenchment. The following categories are not entirely distinct from
each other, however. A particular government action can be
entrenching in multiple ways. A typology nevertheless brings some
conceptual clarity to the topic. Developing categories of entrenchment
also reveals an important trend toward increased entrenchment in
local government actions, a trend that is not apparent when the
doctrines are viewed piecemeal.
As a descriptive matter, this Part demonstrates that governments
have developed increasingly powerful tools over the years for locking
in policy choices, perhaps responding to interlocal competition or
heightened political polarization (possibilities that are considered
below)."o At the same time, courts have become more deferential to
government precommitments. The project here is positive: identifying
the forms of, and expanded opportunities for, entrenchment in local
governments. Normative questions are reserved for Parts IV and V.
A. Contractual Entrenchment
The first and most obvious source of entrenchment through
private law involves local governments entering into contractual
precommitments that bind future governments." These can take a
number of forms.
1. Promises to regulate or to forbear.
At the far end of the spectrum of entrenching government
actions are promises or contracts for specific regulatory treatment in
the future-or at least they would be at the far end of the
entrenchment spectrum if they were permissible. A local government
might try to promise that it will not downzone property in the future
50 See Part 1IID.
5' See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543,
667 (2000) ("In an era of contracting out, enforceable contracts form the connective tissue
between public and private actors; as such, they promise to be important vehicles of policy
making."); Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by
Government, 8 S Cal Interdisc L J 467,467 (1999) (identifying tension "between the power of
government to bind itself and future governments in contract and the freedom of a
democratically elected legislature to override the acts of a prior legislature in response to
evolutions in judgment, information, or politics").
892 [78:879
Public Entrenchment
or that it will grant a variance if a developer applies for one, but such
obligations have traditionally been unenforceable, at least to the
extent that they limit future governments' core regulatory powers.
The inalienable powers doctrine (sometimes called the reserved
powers doctrine) prevents a government from contracting away its
police powers." This should not be particularly surprising since
committing to any particular legal regime in the future is conceptually
indistinguishable from unrepealable legislation insofar as it
prespecifies the application of future law.
What is surprising is that the law's attitude toward such promises
became notably more permissive during the twentieth century. While
a promise not to regulate remains largely unenforceable, a promise to
compensate in the event of a change in the law may be upheld.4 As
the Court of Claims succinctly summarized in Gerhardt E Meyne Co v
United States," the government "cannot enter into a binding
agreement that it will not exercise a sovereign power, but it can say, if
it does, it will pay you the amount by which your costs are increased.""
This marks a change from the traditional rule, as the law now permits
a form of liability rule protection for promises about future
regulations."
In the last few decades, legal reform has taken the enforceability
of government contracts one step further, replacing slow doctrinal
evolution with statutory authority for development agreements.
Starting in the late 1970s with California, a number of states adopted
legislation allowing local governments to bargain away their zoning
52 See, for example, Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the
Contracts Clause, 88 Colum L Rev 647, 675-77 (1988) (reviewing the history of police-power
rules); Stewart E. Sterk, Publicly Held Servitudes in the New Restatement, 27 Conn L Rev 157,
172 (1994) ("The notion that the police power is inalienable arose in the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution."). See also Samuel R. Olken,
Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of Contract Clause
Jurisprudence, 72 Or L Rev 513, 543-44 (1993) (describing the bases for the inalienable powers
doctrine). For a more detailed consideration of this issue, see text accompanying notes 209-19.
53 See Part III.B.1. In the land use context, such promises are likely to be considered illegal
contract zoning. See, for example, Byrd v Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, PC, 564 F
Supp 1425,1427-29 (WD Va 1983).
54 The requirement that such promises be unmistakable has been the source of frequent
litigation, including in the famous case of United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839,875 (1996).
55 76 F Supp 811 (Ct Cl 1948).
56 Id at 815.
57 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1092 (1972). Indemnification
provisions in local government contracts are sometimes limited by state law. Consider, for
example, W.A. Drew Edmondson, Opinion 06-11, 36 Op Okla Atty Gen 76, 81 (Apr 14, 2006)
(describing constitutional limits on use of indemnification provisions that immunize vendors for
their own wrongful actions).
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power." Through state enabling statutes, local governments can offer
an enforceable promise to provide certain regulatory treatment in the
future in exchange for prespecified benefits. A developer, for example,
might promise to provide roads and other infrastructure, as well as
public goods like a park or a school, in exchange for a local
government's commitment to change the applicable zoning
ordinance."
Strikingly, in this one context at least, property owners may be
entitled to specific performance against a local government. Normally,
a contract cannot irrevocably bind the hands of future governments.'
It can, at most, make changing course expensive. But development
agreements are different, as they can, at least in some circumstances,
provide developers with injunctive relief"' The entrenching effect has
therefore clearly passed what traditional anti-entrenchment rules
would permit, marking another place where opportunities for
entrenchment have increased in recent decades.
2. Long-term procurement contracts, franchises, and proprietary
contractual obligations.
Long-term government contracts that are proprietary instead of
public-that is, contracts less explicitly concerned with future
regulatory power-can also have significant entrenching effects.
58 See Brian W. Blaesser, Discretionary Land Use Controls: Avoiding Invitations to Abuse
of Discretion 330-31 & n 5, 351-53 (West 2010); Steven P. Frank, Yes In My Backyard:
Developers, Government and Communities Working Together through Development Agreements
and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 Ind L Rev 227,241-42 (2009).
59 See, for example, Judith Welch Wegner, Moving toward the Bargaining Table: Contract
Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use
Deals, 65 NC L Rev 957, 1014-15 (1987); David L. Callies and Julie A. Tappendorf,
Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution:
Bargaining for Public Facilities after Nollan and Dolan, 51 Case W Res L Rev 663,664-65 (2001).
60 See, for example, Byrd, 564 F Supp at 1429; Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers
and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims against the Federal Government for Specific
Performance, 43 Vill L Rev 155,155 (1998). According to Richard Seamon, the rule has its origins
in this country in the nineteenth century but derives from the English sovereign immunity
maxim that "the King can do no wrong." Seamon, 43 Vill L Rev at 160-61 (cited in note 60). The
Thcker Act, 24 Stat 505 (1887), codified as amended at 28 USC § 1491, formalized this limitation
in remedies against the federal government in 1887, limiting the remedy for breach of contract to
damages adjudicated in the Court of Claims. See United States v Jones, 131 US 1, 18 (1889).
Similar rules apply to the states, though the source of the rule varies state by state. See, for
example, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v IT-Davy, 74 SW3d 849, 855-56
(Tex 2002); Erickson Oil Products v State, 516 NW2d 755,760-62 (Wis App 1994).
61 See Callies and Tappendorf, 51 Case W Res L Rev at 687-89 (cited in note 59) (citing
cases); Wegner, 65 NC L Rev at 1029-38 (cited in note 59) (discussing remedies for
noncompliance with development agreements).
62 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv L Rev 2544,2624 (2005) ("A
legislature ... can give discretionary or even frivolous expenditures constitutional status by
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Governments have become increasingly sophisticated about using
such contracts to capture immediate benefits and lock in policy for the
future."
Consider, for example, the City of Chicago's decision in 2008 to
lease thirty-six thousand of its parking meters (and the right to collect
fees from those meters) to a private company for seventy-five years
for a one-time payment of $1.16 billion.' This deal makes it all but
impossible for a subsequent city government to decide, for example, to
do business with a different company or, more profoundly, to use
parking policy to try to affect broader social issues. These kinds of
changes-and, indeed, perhaps countless others-may be foreclosed,
or at least made prohibitively expensive, by the parking meter
contract. The city may find itself in breach of contract if it attempts to
adopt creative parking responses to economic issues or transportation
problems.
The point goes beyond parking. Procurement contracts often
involve long-term relationships with contractors for large-scale public
incorporating them into contracts. If the state contracts with a private party to make payments in
future years, the Contracts Clause would prevent it from reneging even if it had lost interest in
that project."). For the distinction between governmental and proprietary obligations, see Janice
C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the GovernmentalProprietary Maze,
75 Iowa L Rev 277,379-80 (1990).
63 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 739-40 & n 83
(2010); Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 552 (cited in note 51):
The scope of activities for which government agencies contract with private providers ...
appears moreover to have expanded. Not only do private providers furnish social services
such as health care, and fulfill local government responsibilities such as waste collection and
road repair; they also increasingly perform such traditionally public functions as prison
management.
6 See Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 Minn L Rev 1965,
1994-96 (2011) (discussing the parking meter transaction). For a summary of the deal, see Dan
Mihalopoulos and Hal Dardick, Parking Meter Deal OKd- Rates Going Up, Chi Trib C25 (Dec 5,2008).
65 For an overview of the kinds of issues that parking meters can implicate, see Matthew
Roth, Emotional Debate over New Parking Meters at Marathon SFMTA Hearing, Streetsblog SF
(June 18, 2010), online at http://sf.streetsblog.org/2010/06/18/emotional-debate-over-new-
parking-meters-at-marathon-sfmta-hearing (visited Jan 4,2011):
The SFMTA was accused of using meters to dismantle the middle class, to make drivers feel
like parasites, to repress poor people, to institute a regressive tax, to do away with a good
tradition of free parking, to increase the risk of rape because people will have to park
further from their homes, and to generally destroy the quality of life and well being of San
Franciscans.
66 See Roin, 95 Minn L Rev at 2011-12 (cited in note 64):
The Chicago parking contract similarly ... guarantee[s] the number of parking spaces and
their hours of operation.... The contractual language is drafted broadly enough that it
might give pause to politicians thinking about expanding public transportation or rezoning
plans that might draw commercial traffic away from areas where the Concessionaire has
parking meter rights.
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construction projects, with service providers for outsourced municipal
services, and the like." Increasingly, a government may choose to
finance public buildings-low-income housing, prisons, government
facilities-by outsourcing the development to a private company
while entering into a long-term lease.6 Or a government can
commission infrastructure development -toll roads, landfills-by
allowing a private company to collect fees into the future.9 To the
extent these contracts are enforceable, they can entrench government
priorities, such as what kinds of buildings to develop, which public
services to provide, who should provide them, and what terms will
govern.o In sum, the increased use of procurement contracts and
public-private partnerships creates private contractual obligations
that increasingly affect the policy options for future governments."
3. Consent decrees.
A particularly strong form of contractual precommitment comes
in the form of consent decrees. Although not typically viewed as
private contracts, they are nevertheless contractual in character,
representing private agreements between the government and a
private counterparty to settle litigation." As part of structural reform
litigation, a government will sometimes enter into a consent decree
67 See, for example, Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road
Privatizations, 83 St John's L Rev 351, 352 (2009) (discussing the privatization of a toll road);
National Council for Public-Private Partnerships, Great Falls Wastewater Treatment Plant, online
at http://www.ncppp.org/cases/greatfalls.shtml (visited Jan 4, 2011) (describing the privatization
of water facilities); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla St U L Rev 155, 155-56 (2000).
See also Michaels, 77 U Chi L Rev at 721 n 9 (cited in note 63).
68 See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and
State Constitutional Law, 34 Rutgers L J 907,919-20 (2003) (describing lease financing). See also
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L J 437, 457 & n 65 (2005)
(describing transactions for creating prisons).
69 There is a long history of such contracts. For a review of some early litigation, see text
accompanying notes 178-80. Collective bargaining agreements are another example, though they
are discussed below in the context of financial entrenchment. See text accompanying
notes 147-52.
70 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 157 (cited in note 67) (noting the ability of contracts
to "bind governments to the bad bargains of their predecessors"). Not all contracts are equally
entrenching. A one-time purchase of property may have some long-term financial consequences,
but the contract itself has very limited effect into the future.
71 See id at 162 ("The devolution of authority from federal to state and local governments
has contributed to the rise of contracting out, as lower levels of government turn to private
actors in order to help execute their new responsibilities.").
72 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U Chi Legal
F 19, 20 (noting that a consent decree's "force comes from the parties' agreement, not from the
law that was the basis of the suit"); McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 301 (cited in note 5) ("The
enforceability of a consent decree follows logically from its nature as a hybrid between a
litigated judgment and a contract.").
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with an advocacy group, essentially agreeing to reform government
practices in certain enumerated ways set forth in the document.
Typical cases involve school desegregation, environmental protection,
prison reform, or provision of certain government benefits." The
consent decree then becomes a binding obligation-and, importantly,
one that is specifically enforceable by a court.
Consent decrees are particularly interesting because governments
may welcome institutional-reform litigation. The litigation process
allows government actors to agree to politically unpalatable policy
changes." A consent decree therefore may not embody the negotiated
compromise over a genuine dispute but instead lock in the results of
collaboration between the government and a particular interest
group. Moreover, the consent decree then becomes largely immune
from efforts by subsequent government actors to modify or repeal it."
B. Property Entrenchment
Just like contracts, the private law of property can bind
governments into the future, though typical examples involve more
complex transactions than straightforward bilateral agreements. There
are three broad forms of entrenchment through property rights to
consider: creating property rights, conveying servitudes, and alienating
important resources.
73 For an excellent survey, see McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 311-15 (cited in note 5).
It remains a live issue. See, for example, Horne v Flores, 129 S Ct 2579,2590 (2009).
74 See Flores, 129 S Ct at 2594 ("Injunctions of this sort bind state and local officials to the
policy preferences of their predecessors and may thereby improperly deprive future officials of
their designated legislative and executive powers.") (quotation marks omitted). For a discussion,
see McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 317 (cited in note 5) ("Real issues of democratic
accountability are at stake."); Easterbrook, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 40 (cited in note 72)
("Tomorrow's officeholder may conclude that today's is wrong, and there is no reason why
embedding the regulation in a consent decree should immunize it from reexamination.").
75 See McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 301 (cited in note 5) ("[O]ne of the evils to be
guarded against is the collusive settlement-government lawyers settling a suit on favorable
terms to the opposing party because they expect that successive administrations may be less
sympathetic to its cause.").
76 See Easterbrook, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 34 (cited in note 72) ("It is impossible for an
agency to promulgate a regulation containing a clause such as 'My successor cannot amend this
regulation.' But if the clause appears in a consent decree, perhaps the administrator gets his wish
to dictate the policies of his successor.").
77 See McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 297 (cited in note 5) (identifying cases holding
"that executive officials in one Administration can set policy today and bind their successors to
comply with it tomorrow, by settling a lawsuit on those terms").
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1. Creating property rights.
The first and perhaps most obvious form of entrenchment comes
from the creation of property rights. The vested rights doctrine is the
best example." Once a developer has taken sufficient steps to develop
her property, her development rights are said to vest and are then
protected against subsequent regulatory change." Vesting rules usually
involve the issuance of a permit by the government and some amount
of reliance by the developer on the permit.o One government can
therefore entrench a development agenda vis-A-vis specific property
by allowing development rights to vest, either by issuing permits or
forgoing some new regulation until after development has begun,
depending on the law of the jurisdiction. This can immunize the
development from many forms of subsequent regulation." Of course,
once the development has been completed, it then receives takings
protection from regulatory change as an existing use, but this problem
is taken up below in the context of physical entrenchment."
The vested rights doctrine is notoriously murky and difficult to
navigate." It varies by state, with at least three different substantive
approaches dominating the landscape." But a number of states in the
last few decades have passed legislation defining earlier and more
certain vesting dates, which provide greater protection to property
owners." Expanding the vested rights doctrine in this way creates
78 Vested rights can be seen as the property law analogue to contractual development
agreements See Lyle S. Hosoda, Comment, Development Agreement Legislation in Hawaii: An
Answer to the Vested Rights Uncertainty,7 U Hawaii L Rev 173,187,191 (1985).
79 See John M. Armentano, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 28 Real Est L J 259,259 (2000)
("When a property owner's right to develop a project has 'vested,' regulatory changes will not be
able to affect it, without implicating due-process concerns.").
80 See Brad K. Schwartz, Note, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights,
28 BC Envir Aff L Rev 719,721-22 (2001) (describing early-vesting and late-vesting states).
81 See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 NYU
L Rev 1222, 1242-61 (2009) (surveying constitutional protection for existing uses in the Takings
Clause and the Due Process Clause).
82 See Part II.D.1.
83 See Armentano, 28 Real Est L J at 259 (cited in note 79) ("The anachronistic law
pertaining to 'vested rights'... is fraught with difficulties for developers and ambiguities that
often make it difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty when development rights actually
have vested and when the often very large expenditures they have made can be protected."). See
also Gregory Overstreet and Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest:
Washington's Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 Seattle U L Rev 1043, 1063 n 105 (2000)
(collecting sources).
84 There are the majority and minority common law rules, plus the statutory reforms that a
number of states have adopted. See Overstreet and Kirchheim, 23 Seattle U L Rev at 1060-69
(cited in note 83) (surveying the legal landscape). Some have singled out Washington as
providing yet another approach. See id at 1069-74.
85 See E.A. Prichard and Gregory A. Riegle, Searching for Certainty: Virginia's
Evolutionary Approach to Vested Rights, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 983,991 (1999) ("Beginning in the
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increased opportunities for entrenchment. The decisions by one
government-to grant a permit, to wait to act, or to otherwise allow
private rights to vest-create property rights that run against
subsequent governments.
Additionally, increased recognition of "new property" means that
the vested rights doctrine can entrench a greater panoply of public
entitlements than just buildings and development." Courts have
effectively propertized certain government benefits, which means that
a government that confers such benefits can lock them in for the
future as well.n Pension benefits are a good example. Under a
traditional but now outdated view, pensions were merely a benefit that
could be conferred or withheld at the discretion of the state." Over
time, though, a pension statute came to be viewed as part of a public
employee's contract with the state or local government. As such, an
employee could obtain a contractually vested property right in her
pension benefits." Therefore, creating a pension now has the effect of
limiting future governments' ability to modify those financial
obligations. The effect on future governments is stark and frequently
observed during budget crises," a point considered below in the
context of financial entrenchment.
Local governments may even have some control over what
counts as property in first place. One of the more interesting recent
treatments of the general problem comes from Katrina Wyman's
early 1970s, the judicial view on the vested rights question in Virginia progressively moved to
favor property rights."). The most significant expansion of the vested rights doctrine undoubtedly
comes from vested rights legislation. See Overstreet and Kirchheim, 23 Seattle U L Rev
at 1066-69 (cited in note 83) (describing statutes); Terry D. Morgan, Vested Rights Legislation,
34 Urban Law 131,134 (2002) ("Most vested rights statutes define an even earlier vesting rule.").
86 See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L J 733, 734-37 (1964) (describing the
category of new property). Today, "new property" is "new" only in the way that Disney World's
1970s attraction "Tomorrow Land" represents the future or in the way that "modem" art is
contemporary.
87 See, for example, Poole v City of Waterbury, 831 A2d 211,214-16 (Conn 2003) (finding
vested rights in retiree health insurance benefits); Municipality of Anchorage v Gentile,
922 P2d 248,257-58 (Alaska 1996) (finding vested rights in retiree medical benefits).
88 See, for example, Dodge v Board of Education of City of Chicago, 5 NE2d 84, 88
(Ill 1936).
89 See, for example, Bauers v City of Lincoln, 586 NW2d 452, 463 (Neb 1998); Eugene
McQuillin, 3 The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 12.144, 12.144.05 (West 3d ed 2001)
(describing the history of the treatment of pension rights).
90 See, for example, Roger Lowenstein, Looking for the Next Crisis?, NY Times Mag 9
(June 27,2010); Mary Williams Walsh, In Budget Crisis, States Take Aim at Pension Costs, NY
Times Al (June 20,2010); Timothy Logue, Pension Crisis Could Be Even Worse in Pennsylvania,
Del County Daily Times (Apr 14, 2010), online at http://www.delcotimes.com/articles
/2010/04/14/news/doc4bc52c8cOd30dl32270494.txt (visited Jan 4, 2010). This point is considered
further in the discussion of financial entrenchment. See text accompanying notes 153-55.
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study of New York City taxi medallions." Originally, medallions were
mere licenses, revocable by the government.9 Today, they are
significant assets, valuable because of their scarcity. In recent auctions,
individual medallions have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars."
According to Wyman, by maintaining scarcity and conveying
medallions through auctions and other market transactions, New York
City may inadvertently have transformed them into constitutionally
protected property interests, making the entire regime highly resistant
to change." If the city decided today that it wanted to increase the
supply of taxis by dispensing with the medallion requirement, or if it
merely wanted to double or triple the number of medallions, it might
not be able to do so without compensating current medallion holders.93
In other words, by encouraging the creation of property rights in the
medallions, the government may have entrenched a regulatory
approach to an entire industry.
2. Creating future interests and servitudes.
In addition to the potential for entrenchment emanating from
ownership and property rights generally, property law's system of
formal conveyances provides opportunities for more fine-grained
entrenchment. Consider, first, the sale of property to the government
in a defeasible fee. For example, a government seeking to create a new
park may purchase property from a private owner in fee simple
determinable." The deed might convey the property to the
government so long as the property is not put to any other use.
91 See Katrina M. Wyman, Is Bentham Right? The Case of New York City Taxi Medallions
*8-15 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 2008) (on file with author).
9 See id at *9.
93 See id at *13-15.
94 See id at *21-22. Specifically, she argues that they receive due process protection, though
perhaps not protection under the Takings Clause.
95 See Wyman, Is Bentham Right? at *19-20,32-36 (cited in note 91). Wyman suggests that
due process protection may be quite thin, and that the Takings Clause may not apply at all. At least
one court agrees. See Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition, Inc v City of Minneapolis, 572 F3d 502,
509-10 (8th Cir 2009) (rejecting constitutional protection for taxi licenses). Nevertheless, the extent
of constitutional protection for medallions in New York remains up for grabs
96 The bane of all first-year property students, defeasible fees are fees subject to conditions
in the title. They include the fee simple determinable, the fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, and the fee simple subject to an executory limitation. See Cornelius J. Moynihan and
Sheldon F Kurtz, Introduction to the Law of Real Property: An Historical Background of the
Common Law of Real Property and Its Modern Application 45-47,231-33 (West 4th ed 2005).
9 See, for example, Carstens v City of Wood River, 163 NE 816,816 (Ill 1928) ("Said tract of
land is conveyed to and accepted by said village of Wood River for park purposes, the same to be
maintained as a park for said village, to be governed and controlled by the ordinances of said village
for said purposes"); Department of Public Works v City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal Rptr 531, 534 (Cal
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Notice that the effect is similar to an ordinance directing that the land
be used as a park in perpetuity. Enacted as public law, such an
ordinance would of course be unenforceable. But conveyed by a
private party, as part of a formal limitation on title, a defeasible fee
locks government land into a perpetual use, enforceable through the
threat of forfeiture if the government pursues a different agenda for
the property.
It is commonplace for governments to own property in defeasible
fees." Arguably, however, these situations do not raise real
entrenchment concerns, because a private party (the grantor) is doing
the entrenching, not the government. In other words, this implicates
traditional concerns about dead-hand control but not deeper political
concerns about entrenchment." But it is hard to know whether the
government is complicit in deciding the terms of the conveyance. A
government interested in entrenching the use of property may
actually invite the more limited conveyance instead of acquiring the
property in fee simple absolute. And, whatever the intent, the end
result is the same: the government owns property subject to a
requirement that it be put to a particular use. If the government wants
to change the use, it can do so only by forfeiting the property (or
through condemnation, of which more later)." The entrenching effect
is apparent, even if the government's role can be difficult to discern.
The reverse is also entrenching: when a government conveys
property to a private party in fee simple determinable, conditioned on
some ongoing use of the property. Recent cases demonstrate how
creative governments have become in this regard. The most
interesting is Salazar v Buono."o There, in response to Establishment
Clause concerns about the use of a cross as a war memorial on federal
land, Congress conveyed title to the site to a private group. Congress
conveyed it as a defeasible fee, however, requiring the owner to
continue using the property as a war memorial.'" This effectively
removed from subsequent governments the ability to take a different
App 1960) ("The conveyance was 'upon condition' that the lands be used exclusively as a public
park, and 'upon further condition' that the name Griffith Park be retained by the City.").
98 See Griffis v Davidson County Metropolitan Government, 164 SW3d 267, 272 (Tenn
2005); Basye v Fayette R-III School District Board of Education, 150 SW3d 111, 114 & n 1 (Mo
App 2004) (examining the status of a title for property conveyed in 1892 to a school board in a
defeasible fee limiting the use of the lot to "school purposes").
99 For a discussion of dead-hand control, see text accompanying notes 300-06.
100 See text accompanying note 177.
101 130 S Ct 1803 (2010). See also Mount Olivet Cemetery Association v Salt Lake City,
164 F3d 480, 484-85 (10th Cir 1998) (describing the conveyance of a cemetery in fee simple
determinable).
102 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004 § 8121, Pub L No 108-87,
117 Stat 1054,1100 (2003).
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view of the Establishment Clause or to otherwise permit alternative
speech on the site. It is now in private hands, but held in a way that all
but ensures its ongoing use as a war memorial.'03 Notice that this is
different from an outright sale because the government has kept the
property in its policy tentacles after the transfer. The problem here is
that the government is able to assert continued control over the use of
the property in a way that limits how the private owner can use the
property in the future.
Attentive property lawyers will no doubt recognize that the
entrenching character of this conveyance is more dubious than it may
at first seem. A subsequent government can always choose to release
its reversionary interest, thereby effectively granting the private
owner fee simple title to the property'4 While this would not restore
the property to the government's control, it would at least relinquish
all government constraints embedded in the defeasible fee. Even this
is no complete solution, however. The limitation in the title may well
serve to constrain private use of the property, because even asking the
government for a release can be costly (in time, energy, and money).
As a result, such encumbrances may well remain in place and may
continue to affect the use of the property, even if a subsequent
government would theoretically be willing to waive its enforcement
right.'
Servitudes can sometimes serve a similar function. A case quite
similar to Buono, First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v Salt Lake
City Corp, " involved selling to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints a portion of Salt Lake City's main street, over which the
city retained an easement. According to allegations at the time, the
sale arose out of a desire by the church to regulate the behavior and
dress of people on the public square in front of its church in
downtown Salt Lake City.m To accommodate the church's concern
without violating free speech rights, Salt Lake City simply sold the
property to the church, reserving a public easement so that the public
could enter the property. The goal was apparently to allow the public
the same kinds of access to the property that it enjoyed before the
103 Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its ruling upholding the property conveyance,
the cross was stolen. See David Kelly, Mojave Cross Is Missing; Theft Occurred Soon after
Supreme Court Ruled in Its Favor, LA Times AA1 (May 12,2010).
104 Even if the government retains a right of reentry or a possibility of reverter, either can
be waived, thus reuniting fee simple ownership in the grantee. See Moynihan and Kurtz,
Introduction to the Law of Real Property at 134,139-40 (cited in note 96).
105 Consider Mount Olivet Cemetery Association, 164 F3d at 485 (involving litigation over a
century-old fee simple determinable requiring that the property be used as a cemetery).
106 308 F3d 1114 (10th Cir 2002).
107 See Heather May, Plaza Fight Ends with a Whimper, Salt Lake Tribune Al (Dec 30,2005).
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sale, but subject to the church's ability to regulate conduct and
speech."o' Years of litigation followed, the ins and outs of which have
been well documented in the press and in scholarly accounts.'" The
entrenchment point, however, is this: property formalism gave the
government at least a plausible mechanism for divesting itself of
regulatory control over property while retaining public access."o As a
private conveyance, this arrangement was immunized from
subsequent changes in the city's policy preferences, subject only to
reacquisition, which would probably require eminent domain.
An even more creative use of servitudes has recently
appeared in the dedication of conservation easements to entrench
antidevelopment policies. As described in detail in an earlier work, at
least one local government has conveyed conservation easements over
publicly owned land to a private, third-party conservation group."' The
arrangement is unusual because the government retains ownership of
the underlying property but intentionally severs and conveys away the
development rights. This ensures that the property is preserved in
perpetuity in a way that the public law would never permit. It is nearly
the functional equivalent of passing an unrepealable zoning ordinance
designating certain property as undevelopable.
3. Alienating important assets.
Finally, the simple act of alienating property can be entrenching,
too."2 In fact, any sale or conveyance of public property into private
hands has some entrenching effect. It removes from public control a
resource that otherwise would have been available to future
108 First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, 308 F3d at 1118-19,1122.
109 See Utah Gospel Mission v Salt Lake City Corp, 425 F3d 1249, 1263 (10th Cir 2005)
(holding that the sale did not violate the Establishment Clause). See also David A. Thomas,
Whither the Public Forum Doctrine: Has This Creature of the Courts Outlived Its Usefulness?,
44 Real Prop Trust & Est L J 637, 713-16 (2010); John C. Crees, The Right and Wrong Ways to
Sell a Public Forum, 94 Iowa L Rev 1419, 1428, 1436-38 (2009); Erin Brower, Case Note, Utah
Gospel Mission v Salt Lake City Corp, 38 Urban Law 184,184 (2006).
110 See Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 Nw U L Rev 1361,
1362-66 (2010).
1 See Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev at 343-45 (cited in note 7) (describing the acquisition of
land by the town of Marlboro, Vermont, and the subsequent conveyance of a conservation
easement to a nonprofit group to ensure its future conservation).
112 See Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of
New York in American Law, 1730-1870 45 (Cornell 1989) (characterizing New York City's
eighteenth-century waterfront grants to private parties as abandonment of future planning
power). In the same passage, Hartog provides a powerful quote from historian Josef Konvitz
about the entrenching character of property disposition: "Perhaps the government simply
anticipated New York's growth by abandoning in advance any influence over it." Id, quoting
Josef W. Konvitz, Cities & the Sea: Port City Planning in Early Modern Europe 65 (Johns
Hopkins 1978).
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governments."' Such sales are not usually problematic, however, and it
is difficult to get too exercised over the potentially entrenching
character of routine sales of government assets. But the story is
different when the resource is closely tied to a particular government
program, policy, or objective."'
While selling a generic parcel of land to a private owner is
unlikely to constrain future governments in any meaningful way, some
kinds of resources might: water systems, developable property, natural
habitats, parking meters, municipal buildings, airports, highway
infrastructure -the list goes on."' If a government relinquishes control
over a resource that will be difficult or impossible to replace, and that
is required for some other public goal-providing recreational
facilities, controlling development, preserving local wildlife-it limits
the policy options available for future governments.",
The sale of municipal assets has been on the rise in recent years
in response both to fiscal demands and an increased push for
privatization generally."' This form of entrenchment is therefore also
increasing, as governments sell off more assets that relate to core
municipal functions.'
4. Dedicating public land.
A final example of entrenchment through property conveyances
is the dedication of public land. If someone dedicates property in fee
simple to public use, and the public accepts the dedication, the
property is then held exclusively for that public use in a version of
public trust. The dedication can take the form of a private grant to the
113 In theory, acquiring property can also be entrenching to the extent that it will be difficult
for subsequent governments to divest themselves of certain property, like environmentally
contaminated land. A less obvious example is New York City's acquisition of abandoned
property in the 1970s through in rem foreclosure proceedings. See David Reiss, Housing
Abandonment and New York City's Response, 22 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 783,787-89 (1997).
The effect was a surplus of municipally owned property that took years to unload.
114 It is also different if the resource is sufficiently valuable, but that is better treated as
financial entrenchment, and so is considered below. See Part II.C.2.
115 See, for example, Thomas Blackwell, Privatizing Water Has Pros and Cons, Southern
Illinoisan (Nov 19, 2009), online at http://www.thesouthern.com/news/local/article-aaff26c4-d4c9-
11de-bf5e-001cc4c03286.html (visited Jan 4, 2011) (describing Illinois municipalities that have
privatized municipal water and sewer systems); Jennifer Lin, City Plan to Sell Vacant Properties
Waits on the Market, Phila Inquirer B1 (Apr 27, 2010) (describing the privatization of water
supplies). See also text accompanying note 64.
116 Consider Super, 118 Harv L Rev at 2624 (cited in note 62) ("[If the state sells a needed
asset-such as a state office building-with the intent of leasing it back, future legislatures will
have little choice but to continue to lease that or a similar asset.").
117 See text accompanying notes 134-38.
us See note 115.
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government for public purposes."' It can also take the form of a
municipality itself dedicating property to some public use, like a park,
in which case the government cannot thereafter unilaterally remove
the designation.120 At that point, the property cannot be put to any
other use without an act of the state legislature.
The entrenching character of such dedications has not been lost
on political observers. In a 2009 editorial advocating a particular
rezoning project in Coney Island, the New York Times wrote: "The city
wants to buy out [one property owner] and rezone the nine-acre
outdoor amusement district as parkland. That would powerfully deter
future administrations from damaging this civic treasure, since only
the State Legislature can undo parkland zoning."
C. Financial Entrenchment
Financial entrenchment occurs whenever a government usurps
for its own use the taxing and spending authority of future
governments.'" Issuing municipal bonds is the clearest and most
common form of financial entrenchment. By paying for municipal
infrastructure with a bond, a government is, in essence, prespending
future tax revenue. The entrenchment concern is not restricted to
debt, however. Anything that serves to starve the beast-to use the
conservative movement's tax metaphor-limits the money available
to future governments and therefore constrains future policy choices.124
119 See, for example, Star Island Associates v City of Saint Petersburg Beach, 433 S2d 998,
1003 (Fla App 1983).
120 See, for example, Spires v City of Los Angeles, 87 P 1026, 1026-27 (Cal 1906); Lazore v
Board of Trustees of Village of Massena, 594 NYS2d 400, 402 (NY App 1993) ("[A] parcel may
become a park either through express provision, such as restrictions in a deed or legislative
enactment, or by implied acts, such as a continued use of the parcel as a park or by certain acts of
[the municipality]."); Hall v Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co, 227 P 649,651 (Cal App 1924).
121 See, for example, Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v City of New York, 750 NE2d 1050,
1055 (NY 2001); Commonwealth v City of Corbin, 264 SW2d 263,264 (Ky App 1954), discussing
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v City of Lexington, 186 SW2d 201,202 (Ky App 1945).
122 Editorial, A Plan for Coney Island, NY Times A18 (July 13,2009).
123 See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 917 (cited in note 68) ("[Tlhe ability to shift the costs
forward may also induce elected officials to incur too much debt. The benefits of the project
financed by the debt will be received immediately, while the costs of paying off the debt are
deferred into the future."). For a fascinating treatment of financial entrenchment in the context
of the budget process, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U Pa L Rev 1007, 1056-63
(2011).
124 Proposition 13, California's controversial limit on property taxation adopted by
referendum, has just such an effect. See Cal Const Art XIII A, § 1. For a discussion, see Briffault,
34 Rutgers L J at 929-33 (cited in note 68) (discussing Proposition 13 and other state
constitutional limits). See also Laurie Reynolds, Taxes; Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What
You Pay For" Model of Local Government, 56 U Fla L Rev 373, 392-93 (2004) ("By putting the
spending and taxation limits in state statutes and constitutions, the voters have tied the hands of
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Financial entrenchment in the real world therefore takes one of three
primary forms: (1) incurring debt, (2) monetizing future income
streams (including selling off valuable assets), and (3) directing future
expenditures. 125 Although each arises in a different context, they all
present fundamentally similar entrenchment concerns.
1. Municipal debt.
Municipal debt is a long-recognized example of financial
entrenchment.12 By floating a bond, a government can obtain money
to spend on some program or project today while shifting many of the
costs on to the future. At its core, a municipal bond amounts to an
intertemporal tax transfer from the future, allowing the present
government to make financial choices, the effect of which will
continue for the duration of the bond. A government can allocate
resources to a particular public policy-a new school, park, or
infrastructure of any kind-and burden future governments with the
obligation to pay.
The entrenching character of municipal debt is best observed
through a historical lens. In the early part of the nineteenth century,
many municipalities engaged in fierce competition to attract railroads
and new instrumentalities of commerce.' Cities tried hard to make
politicians and implicitly asserted the inadequacy of political checks as the proper response to
government financial excesses.").
125 An additional category might involve simply taking inordinate financial risks in an effort
to secure immediate benefits. See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, Exotic Deals Put Denver
Schools Deeper in Debt, NY Times Al (Aug 6,2010). That is put aside here.
126 See C. Dickerman Williams and Peter R. Nehemkis Jr, Municipal Improvements as
Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 Colum L Rev 177, 182 (1937) ("[I]n any system
of public economy bonded debt is merely a means of allocating payment between the present
and the future."). At a high enough level of generality, the entrenching character of debt
obligations is not entirely distinct from the contract analysis described in Part II.A. After all,
incurring debt is entrenching only to the extent that debt obligations are, in fact, enforceable.
127 See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U Ill L
Rev 1105,1141 ("The use of public debt to pay for capital expenditures would distribute the cost
of the long-lasting goods, among all the beneficiaries throughout time."). This intertemporal
aspect of debt is well known in broader bankruptcy literature. See, for example, Lee C. Buchheit,
G. Mitu Gulati, and Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 Duke L J 1201,
1204-08 (2007) (describing the "intergenerational tension" in debt).
128 See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 911-12 (cited in note 68); Clayton P Gillette, Local
Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 Nw U L Rev 1057, 1063
(2007). See also Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade
Constitution, 94 Va L Rev 1091, 1136 (2008) ("Restraints on city power were thought necessary
in large part because the state and local political processes had become infected by the railroads,
which could play one municipality off another in the interlocal competition for track location.").
For a different account of southern states and their post-Reconstruction debt, see Stewart E.
Sterk and Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis L Rev 1301, 1310-12 (demonstrating that political
graft was responsible for debt limits in the South).
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themselves hubs for trade, pledging vast sums of money to railroads
and other private enterprises in order to make it happen.12' For most, it
turned out to be an unhappy story, leaving communities with crushing
debt burdens and no new means of servicing their obligations.o In
entrenchment terms, the earlier governments had impoverished their
successors, imposing fiscal straitjackets far into the future. At the time,
states responded with robust new forms of anti-entrenchment
protection - debt limits, bond election requirements, and the like - all
of which are considered below."' Nevertheless, debt levels have again
increased dramatically over the last twenty years.132 Today, in the wake
of the recent financial crisis, many people are foretelling a new
municipal debt crisis.' If it occurs, it will be the result of earlier
governments incurring too many obligations to repay debt into the
future.
2. Restricting future income.
The difference between municipal debt, on the one hand, and a
government selling off valuable assets in exchange for an upfront
payment, on the other, is one of baseline only.13 Like debt, selling
assets generates cash that can be used today while depleting resources
129 See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 911 (cited in note 68); Gillette, 101 Nw U L Rev at 1063
(cited in note 128).
130 See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 911 (cited in note 68) ("Many firms that had borrowed
from the states were unable to repay their loans, and many infrastructure projects failed to
generate projected revenues. The states had great difficulties meeting their obligations to their
creditors."). See also Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1308-10 (cited in note 128)
(describing the results of debt in New York).
131 See Parts III.B and III.C.
132 See, for example, Chris Edwards, State and Local Government Debt Is Soaring, Tax &
Budget Bull No 37, 1 (Cato Institute July 2006), online at http//www.cato.org/pubs/tbb
/tbb_0706-37.pdf (visited Jan 4, 2011) (recording the near doubling of debt owed by state and
local governments between 1990 and 2005).
133 See, for example, Janet Morrissey, Municipal Bonds: The Next Financial Landmine?, Time
(May 24,2010), online at http-//www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1991062,00.html (visited
Jan 4, 2011); Steven Malanga, America's Municipal Debt Racket,Wall St J A17 (June 14, 2010).
134 See Roin, 95 Minn L Rev at 29-30 (cited in note 64). See also Super, 118 Harv L Rev
at 2624 (cited in note 62):
[W]hite a state could pay the bills for construction of a sports stadium, convention center, or
bridge as they come in, issuing bonds for the project postpones most or all of the outlays
into future budget years.
To much the same effect, if the state sells a needed asset-such as a state office building-
with the intent of leasing it back, future legislatures will have little choice but to continue to
lease that or a similar asset.
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that would otherwise be available in the future." This has become an
increasingly common tool in municipal finance."'
If a local government has a valuable income-producing asset -
parking meters, toll roads, airports, water rights-it can monetize that
future income stream and thereby deprive future governments of
income that they otherwise would have received.13 In other words, a
government can exchange the promise of future income for a lump
sum payment today. In theory, the value of the two should be roughly
the same."' But even when that is true, alienating the asset is
entrenching because the present government can allocate the full
value of the asset up front, instead of allowing subsequent
governments to use the income as it comes in.
Similarly, offering tax breaks to induce development can limit
future income."' The trend here tracks closely the history of municipal
135 Selling assets is not always entrenching. If the government merely exchanges one
valuable asset for another, like using the proceeds of the sale to facilitate other revenue-
generating activities, then future governments are no worse off for the earlier sale.
136 See Ed Brock and Brian Sedlak, Selling Public Assets Generates Fast Cash, Am City &
County 12 (Apr 1, 2007) ("By selling public assets, local and state governments are raising funds
and paying down debts without increasing taxes. The strategy was first applied to toll roads, and
now parking garages and state lotteries are up for sale or lease to private investors."). Consider
Katie Benner, Wall Street to Cities: Wanna Sell That Bridge?, Fortune (June 11, 2010), online at
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/11/newsleconomy/privatization publicinfrastructure.fortune/mdex.htm
(visited Jan 4,2011):
Every few years, market chatter about a coming wave of privatizations swells into a sea of
noise and anticipation. Inevitably, the wave crashes, and private investors are usually foiled
.... Now private buyers are in talks for public assets yet again. But this time, there's reason
to believe that more deals could transpire.
137 See Brock and Sedlak, Selling Public Assets, Am City & County at 12 (cited in note 136)
(describing assets sold by Illinois to raise money). In a publicly available memorandum outlining
alternatives for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for dealing with its financial problems, the law firm of
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP identified the following assets available to Harrisburg to sell:
"Parking facilities; City Island, including all sports facilities; Broad Street Market; Water utility
and systems; Land under parking facilities; Sewerage utility and systems; Resource Recovery
Facility; City-owned museums; and Historic artifacts." Memorandum from Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP to City Council Members, Evaluation of Alternatives Available to the City of
Harrisburg to Address Its Current Financial Situation *169-70 (Mar 31, 2011), online at
http://remote.cravath.com/Harrisburg.pdf (visited July 24,2011).
138 For a discussion of federal sales of assets, which are often for less than fair value and to
the detriment of taxpayers, see Harold J. Krent and Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring
Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls,
52 Vand L Rev 1705, 1707 (1999) ("Inefficiency, interest group influence, and graft abound. The
government has donated valuable resources to preferred claimants, allocated scarce broadcast
and oil rights resources by lottery, and sold both public land and the rights to the minerals
beneath to private entities at a fraction of the market price.").
139 See Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1317 (cited in note 128) ("Long-term tax
exemptions can be just as effective, if not more effective, as a mechanism that enables
legislatures to defer payments for current benefits."); Samuel Nunn, Regulating Local Tax
Abatement Policies: Arguments and Alternative Policies for Urban Planners and Administrators,
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debt. Tax abatements were commonplace, and a common source of
abuse, in the nineteenth century.'4 In many states, this led to
constitutional amendments and other restrictions that reduced the
availability of tax abatements to bind future governments.M More
recently, however, states have reversed course, and tax abatements are
142
again a standard tool for stimulating local economic development.
Even today, the enforceability of tax abatements against future
governments remains up for grabs in the case law." In those
jurisdictions (and in those circumstances) where tax abatements are
enforceable, however, their entrenching character is clear. The only
functional distinction between tax abatements and either municipal
debt or monetized income streams is the form of the benefit to the
entrenching government; the effect on the future is the same. All told,
governments today have ever-expanding tools at their disposal to limit
money available to the future.
3. Directing future expenditures.
Directing future expenditures is another form of the same
phenomenon. Orthodox anti-entrenchment rules suggest that it
should be impossible for a government to precommit to any
prespecified level of spending. A promise to fund a library is not
binding on the future. Some sophisticated mechanisms have recently
emerged, however, allowing governments to make such precommitments.
22 Policy Stud J 574,581 (1994) ("[F]uture citizens may face foregone revenues from today's tax
abatements.").
14o See Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1317-18 (cited in note 128).
141 See id. For examples of uniformity provisions enacted in the nineteenth century, see, for
example, Kan Const Art XI, § 1 (originally enacted 1861) ("[T]he legislature shall provide for a
uniform and equal basis of valuation and rate of taxation of all property subject to taxation.");
Mo Const Art X, § 3 (originally enacted 1875) ("Taxes may be levied and collected for public
purposes only, and shall be uniform upon the same class or subclass of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."). See also, for example, Pa Const Art VIII, § 5
(originally enacted 1874) ("All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property
above enumerated shall be void.").
142 See Nunn, 22 Pol Stud J at 574 (cited in note 139). See also Sterk and Goldman,
1991 Wis L Rev at 1316-21 (cited in note 128) (describing the history of government abuse of tax
abatements that led to constitutional reforms but noting their increased use in recent years).
143 Compare City of Louisville v Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 SW2d 219, 224
(Ky 1981) (striking down a contract providing a twenty-year tax abatement to a property owner);
Lykes Brothers v City of Plant City, 354 S2d 878, 880 (Fla 1978) ("[Municipal contracts
promising not to impose taxes, or granting tax exemptions, are ultra vires and void in the absence
of specific legislative authority."), with In re Cromwell Towers Redevelopment Co v City of
Yonkers, 359 NE2d 333, 337 (NY 1976) (upholding a tax abatement for low- and moderate-
income housing despite the city's attempt to renege); City of Shelbyville v Bedford County,
415 SW2d 139,145-46 (Tenn 1967) (upholding a contract providing favorable tax treatment).
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Tax increment financing (TIEF) is the best, but by no means the only,
example.'
TIFs are a relatively new invention that allow governments to
fund infrastructure and other development without incurring general
obligation debt.' Using a TIEF, a government can issue bonds funded
by any increase in property tax revenue in the specific TIF area. TIFs
essentially allow a community to finance redevelopment by pledging a
portion of future increases in the local or sublocal tax base.'" Despite
the word "tax" in the name, TIFs are actually a spending program.
They amount to a local, geographic earmark that can last for decades,
entrenching the revenue stream into the future. In other words, a TIF
allows a government to precommit to spending future property tax
revenues.
Another way local governments can direct future expenditures is
by entering into collective bargaining agreements with their public
employees."' This is something of a hybrid of financial, contractual,
and property entrenchment. Concessions by one government on
wages, hours, and other terms of employment will be binding against
subsequent governments for the duration of the agreement (subject to
144 Another example is a public-private partnership in which a private entity finances a
project, like a prison, and the government enters into a long-term lease for the facility. At the
expiration of the lease, the government might then assume ownership for some nominal
payment. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues 365,
376 (2004), citing Montano v Gabaldon, 766 P2d 1328, 1330 (NM 1989). The form of the
transactions can differ, and many have their origins in tax avoidance. See David Karasko, IRS
Rules on Abusive Tax Shelters, 26 Ann Rev Bank & Fin L 209, 211 (2007) (describing the IRS
designation of "lease-in/lease-out" transactions, a financing mechanism promoting as a capital
funding method in which "a tax-exempt entity [such as a government] leased an asset to a
private company which then immediately leased the asset back to the issuer and received a tax
benefit," as an abusive tax shelter). Another example is "subject-to-appropriation" debt, which
typically involves a bond issued by a public authority, backed by a state promise to repay in the
event that the public authority cannot. See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 920-21 (cited in note 68).
Although such obligations are nonbinding and are only moral obligations, the threat to a state's
bond rating is sufficiently significant that the obligation is almost certain to be repaid. See id at 923.
145 A TIF is a method of public finance in which "investment capital is raised from the
issuance of redevelopment agency bonds to be repaid out of increased property tax receipts from
the project itself, as new construction is added to the tax rolls." See George Lefcoe, After Kelo,
Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests;
Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 Thlane L Rev 45,47 (2008).
146 For an excellent theoretical account of TIFs, see Briffault, 77 U Chi L Rev at 83-94 (cited
in note 8). For a description of the mechanics of TIF financing, see Julie A. Goshorn, Note, In a TIF:
Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 Wash U L 0919,926-28 (1999).
147 See generally S. Barry Paisner and Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Correcting the
Imbalance: The New Mexico Public Employee Bargaining Act and the Statutory Rights Provided
to Public Employees, 37 NM L Rev 357, 361-63 (2007) (describing the history of public
employment law). For a discussion of the political nature of municipal collective bargaining, see
Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective Bargaining and Municipal Governance Compatible?, 5 U Pa J
Labor & Empl L 453,454-55 (2002).
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some limitations discussed below). In many cities, obligations under
collective bargaining agreements can create an institutionalized public
sector bureaucracy that can be difficult for subsequent governments
to undo.14 The financial (and political) lock-in can be financially
crippling."'
This is not to suggest that it is inherently problematic to enter
into such agreements if the benefits to the entrenching government-
in the form of higher quality and more productive workers, for
example -outweigh the expected costs.'" The stability of public sector
jobs can be seen as something of a substitute for cash wages and might
be efficient for both parties."' But the tradeoff is clear, and future
governments will bear a significant portion of the costs in the form of
municipal salaries and post-employment benefits.152
Pension benefits are similar. As noted above, public employees
can obtain vested contractual rights in pension benefits, so that
pension commitments made by one government are immune from
change-or at least downward change-by another.' In fact, the
ability to shift those costs to the future has given rise to increasingly
creative devices to hide the true costs of pension obligations and
divert the political costs to the future as well. These include offering
retroactive pension increases without recognizing added future costs
and using skim funds to siphon off pension funds to divert to other
148 Not that there is anything inherently wrong with that. Tenure is an example of
entrenchment in this way, too, and while it undoubtedly imposes costs into the future, it arguably
secures sufficient benefits in the present-in the ability to attract faculty candidates and provide
diminished compensation in exchange for increased job security-that it is worth the tradeoff.
149 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke:A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425,467 (1993) (describing a
municipal bankruptcy in which the city "pointed to unaffordable union contracts as a key source
of its financial difficulties"); Troy, 5 U Pa J Labor & Empl L at 561-74 (cited in note 147)
(describing the fiscal costs of collective bargaining agreements in municipal bankruptcies or
financial crises). Lock-in can also impede reform. See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public
Sector Labor Law, 84 Ind L J 1369, 1379-80 (2009) (describing collective bargaining agreements
with teachers' unions as impediments to school reform).
150 See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S Ct Rev 207, 211
("[E]mployers offer plans for reasons of economic advantage, in the competition to attract and
retain employees.").
151 Id ("Fringe benefits substitute for cash wages.").
152 One dramatic example of this effect is the use of "rubber rooms" by the New York City
Department of Education. The Department of Education was burdened with thousands of
teachers who could not be put in a classroom but who also could not be fired easily. The response
was to create rubber rooms-essentially holding rooms for teachers to sit in day after day and do
nothing. See Steven Brill, The Rubber Room: The Battle over New York City's Worst Teachers,
New Yorker 30,32 (Aug 31,2009) (reporting that many teachers spend two to five years in such
rooms while proceedings against them continue).
153 See text accompanying note 89.
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spending priorities."4 The financial consequences of pension
obligations can hamstring future governments just as surely as
municipal debt."'
D. Physical Entrenchment
Physical entrenchment bears sufficient resemblance to
entrenchment through property rights that it needs to be addressed,
though it is not technically a form of private law. Property
entrenchment operates through the protection of incorporeal
entitlements created and recognized through the private law. Physical
entrenchment, by contrast, is entirely corporeal. Instead of abstract
rights limiting future governments, the sources of entrenchment here
are physical changes that are not easily undone. These can take the
form of building up or tearing down.
1. Development.
Because of the law's protection of existing uses, any actual
development limits the options available to future governments to
regulate the use of property."' Indeed, it is a common refrain that the
protection for existing land uses makes zoning little more than a
codification of existing patterns of development, rather than a
progressive and forward-looking form of land use planning.
Nevertheless, the extent to which specific development decisions
impose physical limits on subsequent changes in government policy
varies, depending on how hard the land use is to change. Such physical
limitations are particularly entrenching, as the term is used here, to the
extent that physical development locks in policies or other ancillary
commitments beyond the simple fact of the building.
Obvious examples include siting a stadium or other large-scale
commercial development, especially where there are few likely
alternative uses for the building. New York City's decision to support
154 See Mary Williams Walsh, Government Rule Makers Looking at Pensions, NY Times C8
(July 11, 2008).
155 See Justin Cummins and Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World,
39 John Marshall L Rev 563, 569 (2006) ("Notably, the swelling public pension obligations have,
in effect, bankrupted the City of San Diego and put numerous other state and local governments
on that path in Illinois, New York, Ohio, West Virginia, and elsewhere.").
156 See Serkin, 84 NYU L Rev at 1223-25 (cited in note 81).
157 See id at 1225. See also Patrick J. Rohan, 7 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 41.01[2]
at 41-7 (Matthew Bender 2010) ("If the goal of [zoning] regulations was to ensure uniformity of




a new basketball stadium in Brooklyn is a paradigmatic example.'s By
allowing the stadium to be built, the city will all but eliminate a
subsequent government's ability to revisit the current administration's
approach to economic development. Even if a subsequent government
decides that the original policy was wrongheaded and that stadiums
are not good for economic development, the existence of the stadium
will have physically entrenched the earlier judgment (subject to
bulldozing, of course, which is its own kind of de-entrenching
mechanism).' Similarly, a decision by a municipality to permit
development for a certain kind of industry-like Detroit's aggressive
support of the auto industry by facilitating development of new
factories,'6 or New York's recent efforts to support biotech by
developing laboratory space"-may physically entrench the policy
decision to support that industry. The point for entrenchment analysis
is not just that the built environment is difficult to change, but that this
very difficulty can be used to lock in specific policies or priorities.
The shape and capacity of municipal infrastructure can also be
entrenching. Developing excess capacity-roads, wastewater, traffic
controls-can make it harder for future governments to resist
development pressures.' Or, on the flip side, building infrastructure
with limited capacity can make it harder and more expensive to
develop in the future. It is like a form of exclusionary growth control,
but one that is actually more difficult and expensive to change than a
zoning ordinance.
2. Destruction.
Tearing down or destroying a protectable resource-such as
historic buildings or a valuable habitat-will prevent future
governments from being able to change course and protect it.'" The
158 For a review of the complicated project and the litigation it spawned, see Charles V.
Bagli, Atlantic Yards Wins Appeal to Seize Land, NY Times Al (Nov 25,2009).
159 Consider James L. Wescoat Jr, Introduction: Three Faces of Power in Landscape Change,
in James L. Wescoat Jr and D.M. Johnson, eds, Political Economies of Landscape Change 1, 2-4
(Springer 2008).
160 See Zachary Gorchow, Detroit Council Grants Tax Break for GM Plant, Detroit Free
Press 3 (Sept 30,2008).
161 See Joseph De Avila, Biotech Facility Gets off Ground at Brooklyn Terminal, Wall St
J A21 (May 21,2010).
162 See Conn Gen Stat Ann § 8-2(a) (West) (including infrastructure capacity in the list of
factors to weigh when deciding on cluster development). See also Robert H. Freilich, Adequate
Public Facilities Ordinances, 2 SE11 ALI-ABA 581,583 (1999).
163 See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U Ill L Rev 1507,
1511-13.
164 This could even include permitting pollution in an area, making it inhospitable for
subsequent residential development.
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point is an obvious one, but its lure for local governments is important
to understand. Governments, presumably, are not in the business of
destroying potentially valuable property simply on a lark. Instead, and
importantly for present purposes, the destruction of resources can be
undertaken specifically to prevent a subsequent government from
extending protection.
Imagine a pro-development city that wants to stimulate
redevelopment of its downtown. It therefore wants to promise
developers that its prodevelopment policies will remain in place in the
future and that it will continue to support modernizing and gentrifying
its old housing stock. It cannot, of course, promise to forgo
burdensome regulations in the future, but it can dramatically decrease
the likelihood of historic preservation by facilitating the removal of
buildings or even neighborhoods that would otherwise have been
likely candidates for historic protection given a different political
climate in the future." Such behavior is hardly farfetched and is, in
fact, easy to find in private decisionmaking, as when a developer
destroys an old building to prevent a historic designation, fills in
wetlands to beat new environmental protection, or clear-cuts a forest
. . 166
to prevent endangered species from moving in.
Table 1 captures key examples from the categories of
entrenchment.
165 For discussion of the doctrines preventing a government from promising future
regulatory treatment, see Part III.B.
166 See Ralph Michael Stein, Buildings That Go Crash in the Night: A Special Problem in
Historic Preservation Law, 16 Real Est L J 242, 243 n 5 (1988) (describing conversations with
attorneys in which they confessed that intentional destruction or modification of buildings to
prevent designation as a historical landmark is a common practice). See also Joey Arak, Historic
Chinatown Buildings Demolished to Avoid Landmarking?, Curbed NY (May 13,2010), online at
http://ny.curbed.comlarchives/2010/05/13/historic chinatown-buildingsdemolished-to-avoid-1a
ndmarking.php (visited Jan 4, 2011); Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse




TABLE 1. FORMS OF ENTRENCHMENT
Mechanism Examples
(1) Contract * Promises to forbear
* Procurement contracts
* Development agreements
(2) Property * Creating property rights
* Future interests and servitudes
* Alienating assets
(3) Finance * Debt
* Monetizing assets
* Setting spending
(4) Physical * Developing infrastructure
* Destruction of valuable resources
III. PROTECTION FROM ENTRENCHMENT
Both the Constitution and core tenets of democratic theory
prevent formal entrenchment -that is, making ordinary legislation
unrepealable.' Other doctrines serve a similar if less obvious function
by limiting the various forms of entrenchment through private law.
Although not usually conceptualized as entrenchment protection,
these doctrines, taken together, can usefully be construed as ensuring
that governments are limited in their capacity to remove
decisionmaking authority from future governments.
As a first cut, protection against entrenchment can operate either
ex post or ex ante. The latter includes both substantive and procedural
protections that either prohibit certain government actions outright or
impose procedural requirements to limit some of the risks that
entrenchment presents.' Once again, the value of considering these
various doctrines together is in finding surprising commonality in
disparate-seeming doctrines and in revealing a trend in the law toward
expanded opportunities for entrenchment. As protection from
entrenchment is scaled back, government precommitments become
even more binding.
The distinction between ex ante and ex post protections is not as
clean as it might appear. The existence of ex post protections can
167 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1665 (cited in note 2); Richard Albert,
Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 Ariz St L J 663,667 (2010).
168 The distinction between procedural and substantive anti-entrenchment rules borrows
heavily from David Dana and Susan Koniak, who identify similar doctrines that are protective of
sovereignty. See Dana and Konaik, 148 U Pa L Rev at 485-86 (cited in note 20). The distinction
between property and liability rules obviously comes from Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L
Rev at 1092 (cited in note 57).
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powerfully deter entrenching actions ex ante. In fact, the principal
effect of de-entrenching mechanisms can be on the ex ante incentives
of the government to make precommitments in the first place, and of
private parties to rely on them. The strongest forms of ex post
protection are even functionally indistinguishable from prohibiting
government actions in the first place.' Nevertheless, separating these
protections brings some conceptual clarity to the breadth of responses
to entrenchment concerns.
A. Ex Post Entrenchment Protection
As a practical matter, ex post de-entrenching mechanisms are the
broadest form of entrenchment protection and therefore the most
important. They provide governments with tools for escaping previous
governments' precommitments. The existence of ex post protections
does not entirely eliminate the entrenching effect of government
actions because they can be costly to exercise (economically and
politically)."o The extent of entrenchment therefore varies with the
cost of using these de-entrenching mechanisms. The more expensive it
is for a government to de-entrench itself, the less flexibility subsequent
governments have."'
1. Breach.
Given the potentially entrenching effect of long-term contracts,
an important de-entrenching mechanism for subsequent governments
is the ability to breach preexisting contractual obligations.
Governments are seldom subject to specific performance as a remedy
for breach of contract."' With only few exceptions, public contracts are
enforced against governments with a liability rule instead of a
property rule, and damages are typically limited to reliance instead of
expectation damages."' That is, a government can often avoid its
contractual precommitments by paying money-and less money than
a private party would have to pay.
The exceptions to liability rule protection are expanding,
however. As described above, the rise of development agreements
provides a new opportunity for governments to enter into contracts
169 See Part III.B.
170 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 77 (1986)
(describing "due process costs" of eminent domain).
171 For more on the calibration question, see Part IV.
172 See Easterbrook, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 37 (cited in note 72) ("By and large even
authorized contracts may not be specifically enforced against governments").
173 See Fischel and Sykes, 1 Am L & Econ Rev at 354 (cited in note 19); Seamon, 43 Vill L
Rev at 156 (cited in note 60).
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for future regulations that can be enforced through specific
performance.' Likewise, some kinds of tax abatement programs,
especially those authorized by state enabling statutes to encourage
low- and moderate-income housing, are specifically enforceable.'" This
dramatically increases the entrenching character of these government
precommitments.
Even when contract remedies against the government are limited
to damages, the ability to breach is no panacea for entrenchment
concerns because it applies only to contracts in which some future
performance is required of the government. It allows a government to
de-entrench procurement and service contracts in which the
government has an ongoing duty to pay. But it provides little relief
from the entrenching effect of vested contractual rights, like
franchises."'
2. Eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the ultimate de-entrenching safety valve
because it creates flexibility across a wide swath of entrenching
devices. Vested development rights, for example, can be taken through
eminent domain, as can servitudes and future interests. If an earlier
government conveyed away conservation easements over property it
owned or acquired property in a defeasible fee, a subsequent
government can use eminent domain to reunify ownership.'" Similarly,
if a government entrenches a policy decision by selling a valuable
asset, then a subsequent government can always revisit that decision
by compelling a sale back.
The power of eminent domain to de-entrench earlier government
decisions extends beyond interests in real property. Contractual
obligations can also be undone through condemnation-for example,
by removing contractual rights given to licensees or franchisees.'' One
of the first litigated cases involved a toll-bridge franchise granted by
174 See note 61 and accompanying text.
175 See In the Matter of Cromwell Towers Redevelopment Co v City of Yonkers,
359 NE2d 333,337 (NY 1976).
176 The entrenching effect of a contract that the government has already performed is at
least partly the result of sunk costs. Rationally or not, a subsequent government may be
unwilling to change course if it means "wasting" money already spent on the project. See Serkin,
84 NYU L Rev at 1270 n 228 (cited in note 81) (discussing sunk costs).
177 See Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev at 359-60 (cited in note 7).
178 See, for example, In re Opening of Twenty-Second Street Opening, 102 Pa 108,115 (1883)
(upholding Pennsylvania's right to condemn a corporation's property despite a preexisting
statute granting the corporation a franchise .that included perpetual immunity against the
government opening streets in its cemetery).
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the State of Vermont in 1795 over the West River.'7 Subsequently, in
1839, the state passed a statute allowing for the creation of new
"highways," even where doing so would involve taking an existing
franchise. Shortly thereafter, the Town of Brattleboro approved the
location for a new highway that passed over the toll bridge. In other
words, Brattleboro sited the free, public road over the toll bridge.
Pursuant to the state statute, this involved the power of eminent
domain and required the town to pay compensation to the bridge
owners for the value of their franchise."o But the existence of the
franchise-a vested contract right-was no bar to the state's power to
condemn, the plaintiff's claims notwithstanding.'
Condemnation of contracts is hardly commonplace, and it
implicates a complex interaction with the Contracts Clause."
Nevertheless, all contracts with the government are subject to the
government's power of eminent domain. As the Supreme Court
explicitly held in 1934, "The reservation of this necessary authority of
the State is deemed to be a part of the contract."8 . And, indeed, the
case law is speckled with examples of governments condemning
contractual obligations."'
Other incorporeal property rights-taxi medallions, employment
benefits, and the like-are also subject to eminent domain, limiting
the entrenching effect of property rights and contracts generally.
Ultimately, then, eminent domain provides an opportunity for
subsequent governments to buy back decisionmaking authority over
preexisting precommitments. Its availability substantially limits
entrenchment concerns, at least to the extent it is more than
theoretically available.
179 See West River Bridge Co v Dix, 47 US (6 How) 507,530 (1848).
180 Act Relating to Highways § 1 (Nov 19, 1839), in The Revised Statutes of the State of
Vermont 553-54 (Chauncey Goodrich 1940). Tellingly, the proponents of the new road invoked
entrenchment concerns in their proposal. In prescient language, their petition argued,
[T]he legislature in the infancy of the State may have exercised a sound discretion in
granting said toll-bridge, yet, in the present improved and thriving condition of the
inhabitants, your petitioners are unable to discover any good reason why said grievance
should longer be endured, or why the wealthy town of Brattleboro' should not, as well as
other towns much less able, sustain a free bridge across West River.
West River Bridge Co, 47 US (6 How) at 509.
181 See West River Bridge Co, 47 US (6 How) at 536.
182 See text accompanying notes 211 and 216.
183 Home Building and Loan Association v Blaisdell, 290 US 398,435 (1934).
184 See, for example, City of Cincinnati v Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co, 223 US 390,
407 (1912); Long Island Water Supply Co v Brooklyn, 166 US 685, 692 (1897). For a general
consideration of the problem, see John D. Echeverria, Public Takings of Private Contracts, Ecol L
Q (forthcoming 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782064 (visited Aug 31,2011).
918 [78:879
Public Entrenchment
Here again, however, the tide is turning. Reforms following Kelo
v City of New London.. have restricted the power of eminent domain
in many states, removing one of the core de-entrenching mechanisms
from local governments' toolkits. ' The effect on entrenchment is
considered in detail in Part V. For now, it is enough to recognize these
reforms as part of the trend toward increased entrenchment.
3. Bankruptcy.
Municipal bankruptcy serves a similar role by limiting financial
entrenchment ex post. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code deals
specifically with municipal bankruptcy, and some of its provisions
apply different protections to public debtors than the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code applies to private ones." It turns out that
entrenchment concerns are a central reason for having special
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code applicable to municipalities.
An interesting distinction from private bankruptcy, for example,
is that courts do not have the authority in public bankruptcy to
oversee municipal spending decisions.'89 Whereas private bankruptcy
involves close judicial oversight of spending and spending priorities
while an entity is in bankruptcy, municipal bankruptcy does not allow
courts to invade municipal discretion over spending9 This, in effect,
ensures that present municipal spending decisions receive priority -in
the bankruptcy sense-over past debt.9' A subsequent government
can adopt its own spending priorities while in bankruptcy,
185 545 US 469 (2005).
186 See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2105 (cited in note 14) (noting that, since Kelo, thirty-six
states have enacted legislation restricting the use of eminent domain).
187 See 11 USC §§ 109(c),901-46. For a discussion of the special characteristics of municipal
bankruptcy, see McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 455-68 (cited in note 149). For a
discussion of its predecessor statute, see generally Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The
New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976 Duke L J 1157 (discussing Chapter 9).
188 It is also explicable in light of the history of municipal bankruptcy, as well as the
complex limits on state responses to municipal debt imposed by the Contracts Clause and on
federal responses imposed by structural limits of federalism. See McConnell and Picker, 60 U
Chi L Rev at 427-28 (cited in note 149). Some of the curious limits in Chapter 9 are therefore
also explicable in light of constitutional limits (real or perceived) on federal responses to
municipal debt. Id at 450-54 (discussing the history of federal bankruptcy law).
189 11 USC § 904. See also McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 434-35,462-63 (cited
in note 149); Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 BU
L Rev 633,650-54 (2008) (discussing Chapter 9 and its differences from corporate bankruptcy).
190 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 435 (cited in note 149), citing City of East
St. Louis v Zebley, 110 US 321,324 (1884).
191 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 435 (cited in note 149) (observing that the
rule preventing federal courts from interfering with spending decision in municipal bankruptcy
"gave current city expenditures absolute priority over payment of past obligations").
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notwithstanding the fact of its preexisting obligations. This is
powerfully de-entrenching, indeed.
Collective bargaining agreements are also subject to an
interesting form of ex post liability rule protection. In Chapter 9
bankruptcy, a municipality can sometimes abrogate collective
bargaining agreements, becoming liable only for contract damages,
which are treated as unsecured claims against the local government.'9'
In other words, a municipality in bankruptcy may be able to avoid
many of its employment obligations.'93
In actual practice, municipal bankruptcy is not a silver bullet for
avoiding financial entrenchment. In order to file under Chapter 9, a
municipality must meet five threshold requirements that are far more
stringent than those that apply to private debtors.'4 Chief among those
is that the state must authorize a municipality to file for bankruptcy,
and many states have been extremely reluctant to do so.' The number
of municipal bankruptcies filed under Chapter 9 since its enactment is
therefore very small.
4. Failure to enforce.
The most brazen de-entrenching mechanisms are those that allow
governments simply to walk away from their commitments. Financial
entrenchment again provides the clearest examples. Faced with their
inherited crushing debt burdens, governments in the nineteenth
century found various ways to avoid their predecessors' financial
precommitments. For example, some governments -even state
governments -simply refused to repay their debt.'97 More creatively,
some municipalities dissolved themselves as independent jurisdictions,
192 Id at 467. McConnell and Picker find no strong justification-aside from inadvertence-
for Congress's treatment of municipal collective bargaining agreements. It nevertheless serves a
strong anti-entrenchment purpose.
193 See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 652 (cited in note 189) ("[T]he municipality may frustrate
the unsecured creditors by paying them less than their full claims, while still continuing to render
services to the residents.").
194 Id at 650 ("To enjoy bankruptcy protection, a locality must meet five threshold
requirements, which are different (and more difficult) than the requirements other debtors face.").
195 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 457 & nn 141-43 (cited in note 149).
Bankruptcy will reduce a government's creditworthiness, making it more difficult and expensive
to raise money in the future. Indeed, sinking a bond rating is its own form of entrenchment, and
one that can have quite damning consequences.
196 See id at 470.
197 See Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 911 (cited in note 68) (identifying four states that
disclaimed debt); Alberta M. Sbragia, Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, US. Federalism, and
Economic Development 59-60 (Pittsburgh 1996) (describing the repudiation of municipal bonds
and other debt in nineteenth century). This raised deep conceptual problems about creditors'
remedies when governments refused to pay. For a rich history, see McConnell and Picker, 60 U
Chi L Rev at 430-33 (cited in note 149).
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only later to be reconstituted, their debts expunged.' In other
instances, city officials resigned so that no one could levy taxes to pay
off municipal debt.'" This was effective because courts in some
jurisdictions could not compel appointment of a receiver outside the
ordinary electoral process in order to levy taxes.9 o
More generally, courts are sometimes reluctant to enforce
government precommitments, and this can amount to de facto de-
entrenchment. The most famous example involves the Charles River
Bridge.' In 1785, Massachusetts conveyed a monopoly franchise to
the Charles River Bridge Corporation to operate a toll bridge across
the Charles River. The bridge was an enormous success. Indeed, it was
such a success that Massachusetts subsequently granted a second
charter to open a new bridge. This direct competition resulted in an
immediate loss of revenue for the Charles River Bridge Corporation,
which sued, alleging that the government had promised it exclusive
rights for forty years. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
earlier grant to the Charles River Bridge was not exclusive. For there
to have been such exclusivity, it would have to have been more
explicitly provided for in the language of the grant.20
Most people rightly view this case as establishing an early form of
procedural protection by requiring government promises of
exclusivity to be clear and unambiguous.o The Court essentially
established a prospective rule channeling precommitments
guaranteeing exclusivity into a specific form. From the perspective of
the parties in the Charles River Bridge litigation, however, the case is
better seen as providing property rule protection to the government.
There is little doubt that both Massachusetts lawmakers and the
private corporation believed the charter to be exclusive for forty
years.2 04 In effect, the Supreme Court created a rule of construction to
allow the government to avoid the terms of its earlier promise. Courts
are sufficiently wary of holding governments to binding obligations
198 Sbragia, Debt Wish at 60 (cited in note 197).
199 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 436 (cited in note 149), citing Walkley v
City of Muscatine,73 US 481 (1867).
200 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 436 (cited in note 149).
201 See Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge,36 US (11 Pet) 420,465 (1837).
202 See id at 465.
203 See, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory
Takings, 86 Va L Rev 1435, 1463-64 (2005); Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact:
Adjusting Prices and Expectations in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 Ohio St L J 1265,
1297 & n 233 (2006); James W. Ely Jr, Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 Charleston
L Rev 371, 379-80 (2010).
204 Charles Warren, The Charles River Bridge Case, 3 Green Bag 2d 78,79 (1999).
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that such judicial moves are hardly uncommon.205 Following the case
and others like it, private companies have good reason to worry about
the enforceability of their contracts with the government.
In addition, some doctrines limit even what counts as breach by a
government, allowing subsequent governments more flexibility.
Consider, for example, a government contract with a private developer
to build a new building. Subsequent regulations limiting access to
construction vehicles over roads or public lands, changing local building
codes, or imposing other new regulatory requirements that increase
costs will usually not count as breach.20 The greater the public harm at
stake, the more leeway a government will have to act without even
breaching the contract.07
B. Ex Ante Prohibitions
While de-entrenching mechanisms like eminent domain serve to
preserve flexibility ex post by allowing subsequent governments to
avoid preexisting obligations, a number of doctrines function together
to limit the kinds of entrenching actions governments can take in the
first place. A legislature simply cannot pass unrepealable legislation,
and any effort to do so is void from the beginning. Although not often
viewed in these terms, other doctrines serve fundamentally the same
function. The inalienable powers doctrine and the public trust doctrine
are the most conspicuous examples, though they are merely
illustrative. There are other doctrines, too, that simply prevent
governments from engaging in activities that are particularly
entrenching."
205 See Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 695 (cited in note 52) ("[T]he Supreme Court has long
used rules of construction and interpretation of legislative contracts in ways that have absolved
subsequent legislatures from unwanted burdens.").
206 This flexibility is an offshoot of the inalienable powers doctrine, described in
Part III.B.1.
207 Consider Wegner, 65 NC L Rev at 974 (cited in note 59) ("[G]overnment action in
derogation of public contract rights may be justified, but only under circumstances that reflect an
appropriate balance between the need to respond to police power concerns and the obligation to
avoid public and private abuse of that power.").
208 For example, certain topics are off-limits for public collective bargaining agreements. In
some states, courts have imposed strict limits on the subjects that can be negotiated with
teachers, taking off the table issues relating to the school calendar, charter schools, and non-
teaching duties. See Malin, 84 Ind L J at 1384-85 (cited in note 149). In general, issues of public
policy are not within the scope of collective bargaining. See School Committee of Boston v
Boston Teachers Union, 389 NE2d 970, 973-74 (Mass 1979); Town of Burlington v Labor
Relations Committee, 454 NE2d 465,469 (Mass 1983).
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1. Inalienable powers and public trust.
As noted above, the inalienable powers doctrine prevents
governments from bargaining away their regulatory powers. The limits
of the doctrine are porous and often ill defined.2 09 Nevertheless, its
core function is to preserve subsequent governments' power to
regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of their constituents.210
This doctrine has its roots in Contracts Clause jurisprudence.21'
Although the Contracts Clause ostensibly limits governments' ability
to interfere with preexisting contracts, many early cases curtailed its
applicability to government contracts by delineating powers that the
government had no right to bargain away in the first place.21 For
example, Stone v Mississippi" involved a Contracts Clause challenge
to a new state law outlawing the sale of lottery tickets.214 The claim was
brought by a company that had previously been given exclusive rights
to conduct lotteries for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court rejected
the claim against the government, holding that the state legislature, in
granting the lottery franchise, did not have the ability to contract away
its police power and, further, that any attempt to do so would not
create rights protected by the Contracts Clause.21
In the nineteenth century, this was a relatively narrow limitation
on government contracting, because courts had a constrained sense of
police power regulations."' Only regulations specifically advancing the
health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public were inappropriate
209 See Griffith, 75 Iowa L Rev at 284 (cited in note 62).
210 See Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 697-99 (cited in note 52) (justifying inalienable powers
doctrine on reasoning resembling that which underlies entrenchment concerns).
211 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts."). For an excellent history of Contracts Clause jurisprudence, see generally James
W. Ely Jr, The Protection of Contractual Rights:A Tale of Two Constitutional Provisions, 1 NYU J
L & Liberty 370 (2005).
212 See, for example, Beer Co v Massachusetts, 97 US 25, 32-33 (1878) (rejecting a Contracts
Clause challenge to a prohibition law by the owner of a state-granted liquor manufacturing
franchise because the state could not contract away its power to legislate for health, safety, and
morals); Fertilizing Co v Hyde Park, 97 US 659, 669-70 (1878) (rejecting a Contracts Clause
challenge by the holder of a fertilizer franchise to new restrictions on transporting fertilizer
because the franchise was necessarily issued subject to valid police power legislation). See also
Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 675-79 (cited in note 52) (discussing cases).
213 101 US 814 (1880).
214 Id at 814-16.
215 Id at 820 ("The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to
property rights, not governmental."). See also Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock
Landing Co v Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co, 111 US 746, 750-51
(1884) (same); New York & New England Railroad Co v Bristol, 151 US 556, 571 (1894); Ely,
1 NYU J L & Liberty at 377-78 (cited in note 211) (discussing these cases).
216 See Ely, 1 NYU J L & Liberty at 378 (cited in note 211) (describing the relationship
between police power and the Contracts Clause).
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subjects for government contracts.' By the twentieth century,
however, the general outlines of states' police powers expanded
dramatically to include regulations advancing a broad conception of
public welfare."' In practice, this meant that contracts with the
219government were subject to expansive inalienable powers.
The public trust doctrine operates in fundamentally the same
way. It defines certain categories of property that are held in trust for
the public and that therefore cannot be sold, despite government
attempts to do so." Again, the boundaries of the doctrine are evolving
and contested. Traditionally limited to navigable waters,"' the public
trust doctrine in many states expanded during the twentieth century
to include access to beaches and even historic sites and environmental
resources.22 In effect, this doctrine circumscribes the opportunities for
entrenchment through the sale of valuable or important resources.22
These are two places, then, where opportunities for entrenchment
have decreased, against the tide of most other legal changes.
Here, the porous boundary between ex ante anti-entrenchment
protection and ex post protection is on stark display. For example,
courts striking down Contracts Clause challenges to government
regulations interfering with pre-existing contracts did so on grounds
217 Id.
218 See id at 378-79. See also Olken, 72 Or L Rev at 548 (cited in note 52) ("During the first
two decades of the twentieth century the concept of inalienable police powers broadened as
Court personnel changed and some of the more progressive justices included economic
prosperity and progress as objectives within the sphere of public welfare."); Meg Stevenson,
Aesthetic Regulations: A History, 35 Real Est L J 519,522-26 (2007) (discussing the inclusion of
aesthetics as part of the general welfare).
219 See Ely, 1 NYU J L & Liberty at 378-79 (cited in note 211) ("Once it became clear that
legislative determinations of public welfare could override the security of agreements, the
Contracts Clause would be dramatically reduced in constitutional significance.").
220 Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U Chi L Rev 799, 800 (2004). For a
consideration of public trust doctrine generally, see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide
to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, 16 Penn St Envir L Rev 1 (2007).
221 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich L Rev 471,475 (1970).
222 The public trust doctrine has "emerged from the watery depths [of navigable waters] to
embrace the dry sand area of a beach, rural parklands, a historic battlefield, wildlife,
archeological remains, and even a downtown area." Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L
Rev 631, 649 (1986). See also Craig, 16 Penn St Envir L Rev at 21-24 (cited in note 220). For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the public trust doctrine should not be static
but rather should evolve over time to meet the needs of the public. Borough of Neptune City v
Borough ofAvon-by-the-Sea, 294 A2d 47,54-55 (NJ 1972).
223 It serves other purposes as well. It also applies to the present government, perhaps
preventing the creation of fractionated ownership rights. See Michael Heller, The Gridlock
Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 197-98
(Basic Books 2008).
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that the original government did not have the power to enter into the
contract in the first place.224 These courts, in effect, were defining the
limits of the government's power to contract, and for this reason the
inalienable powers doctrine looks like a substantive ex ante limitation.
Of course, the cases themselves were litigated after the fact, in effect
allowing a subsequent government to escape the contractual
precommitments of its predecessors. In this regard, the doctrine looks
more like a de-entrenching mechanism. Fortunately, there is little at
stake for the argument here in choosing where to locate the
protection. The point remains: substantive entrenchment protection
limits a government's ability to bind the future by carving out things
the government simply may not do.
2. Debt limits.
Debt limits are another example of anti-entrenchment protection
that prohibits overly entrenching government actions. In response to
the municipal debt crisis in the nineteenth century described above,
states intervened and created robust new forms of anti-entrenchment
protection that limited the ability of local governments to incur debt.
Chief among these were rules that prohibited municipalities from
incurring debt beyond a certain level, often measured as a percentage
of total assessed local property value.22 These rules are sometimes
226justified explicitly as a response to entrenchment concerns.
During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, local
governments have found increasingly creative ways to circumvent
those debt limits."' A local government today can, for example, create
a new special purpose government-such as a school or water
district-which can then effectively start over because the special
224 See, for example, Beer Co, 97 US at 32-33.
225 Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 915-17 (cited in note 68) (surveying approaches to debt
limits); Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 Denver U L Rev 1241,1256 (2009) (describing the
history of debt limits). See also Super, 118 Harv L Rev at 2606-07 (cited in note 62) ("[D]istrust
of transient majorities and their lack of concern for the future was a key element of the
Jacksonian fiscal constitution.").
226 See, for example, Briffault, 34 Rutgers L J at 918 (cited in note 68) ("A central
justification of constitutional limits on debt is to offset the temptations that can cause elected
officials to burden future generations with unnecessary debt."); Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 720-21
(cited in note 52) ("[The] very existence of [constitutional provisions requiring voter approval to
accrue debt] demonstrates that the attempt to develop institutional mechanisms to cope with the
problem of legislative discontinuity has been longstanding.").
227 See Super, 118 Harv L Rev at 2607 (cited in note 62) ("As the abuses that gave rise to
the Jacksonian provisions [limiting debt] faded from memory and an industrializing and
urbanizing nation put more demands on its state and local governments, states relaxed some of
the Jacksonian strictures.").
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purpose government's debt does not count against the municipality.
Similarly, debt used to finance income-producing projects is not
counted toward a municipality's debt limits, so long as the debt is self-
liquidating.229  Other examples exist as well. In short, local
governments have become increasingly adept at avoiding the
protections that states adopted in the nineteenth century specifically
in response to entrenchment concerns. Here, again, opportunities for
entrenchment are increasing.
C. Procedural Protection
In addition to the outright prohibitions described in the previous
section, a number of doctrines create specific procedural protections
that reduce the greatest risks of entrenchment. For reasons developed
below, entrenchment is particularly problematic to the extent a
government can capture the benefits of a precommitment while
externalizing the costs on to the futurenl Relevant procedural
protections, then, are those that force a government to internalize the
long-term costs of its actions or at least to consider the effects of its
actions on the future. Instead of preserving future flexibility directly,
they decrease the risk of allowing governments to decide the strength
of their precommitments for themselves. This is in contrast to de-
entrenching mechanisms and substantive prohibitions, which
determine how binding a government precommitment actually is.
Some procedural anti-entrenchment protections come in the
form of procedural safeguards that channel potentially entrenching
government actions into explicit and especially visible decisions. The
best example is the bond election requirement. A number of state
constitutions require a special election before a local government can
float a bond.232 By holding a single-issue election in which the terms of
228 See Joseph F. Gricar, Comment, Municipal Corporations: Circumventing Municipal Debt
Limitations, 48 Mich L Rev 1016, 1016 (1950). See also, for example, Lyon v Strock, 118 A 432,
433 (Pa 1922) (school district); Kennebec Water District v Waterville, 52 A 774, 783 (Me 1902)
(water district).
229 Gricar, Comment, 48 Mich L Rev at 1016 (cited in note 228).
230 See Charles W. Goldner Jr, State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An
Integrated Approach, 26 Wake Forest L Rev 925, 936 (1991) ("The special funds doctrine, use of
overlapping political subdivisions, creation of special authorities, use of true leases and service
contracts, and more recently, the use of lease-purchase financing, have all received judicial
blessing."); Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1330-33 (cited in note 128) (identifying
similar ways of circumventing debt limits).
231 See Part IVA.
232 See, for example, Mich Const Art IX, § 15 ("The state may borrow money for specific
purposes in amounts as may be provided by acts of the legislature adopted by a vote of two-
thirds of the members ... serving in each house, and approved by a majority of the electors
voting thereon at any general election."). See also Gillette, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues at 370
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the bond are specifically laid out, the issue will have added political
salience for local voters, who will be more likely to consider the costs
of the bond into the future.m This is especially true in local
governments where any increase in property taxes to service the bond
is likely to be capitalized into property values)" Bond election
requirements have lost much of their bite in recent years, however,
because governments both have found ways around triggering them
and can avoid their outcomes through various procedural
machinations.'5
Development agreements provide another good example of ex
ante procedural protections. State legislation varies, but often requires
public hearings and city council approval for any development
agreement.2 6 On paper, at least, this appears to be relatively robust
procedural protection, geared specifically to address the threat of
political malfunction. It increases the visibility of the decision and
takes final authority out of the hands of smaller, parochial interests.
There is debate, however, about how meaningful the procedural
protections actually are, given the typical politics that surround
development decisions.
It is important to recognize that not every procedural
requirement counts as meaningful anti-entrenchment protection.
Procedural requirements are anti-entrenching only to the extent they
require or encourage a government to consider the effect of its action
on the future2n Sometimes, mere sunshine is enough; visibility is
powerfully anti-entrenching if current voters expect to be shouldering
the burdens of higher taxes in the future. But not every procedural
requirement has this effect. The obligation to secure multiple bids in
procurement contracts, for example, creates a meaningful procedural
hurdle but provides only minimal protection against entrenchment."
It protects against fraud and ensures that the government enters into
(cited in note 144) (stating that twenty-seven states have constitutional provisions requiring
elections before a municipality can issue debt).
233 See Gillette, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues at 372 (cited in note 144).
234 See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis at 5-8 (cited in note 41) (discussing capitalization).
235 See Gillette, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues at 375-80 (cited in note 144).
236 See Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is Neither
Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 Cap U L Rev 383, 396-99 (2004) (describing
requirements).
237 See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-
Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 Hofstra L Rev 37,59 (2006) (arguing
that procedural safeguards are inadequate).
238 See Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 707 (cited in note 52). Otherwise-absent deliberation-
procedural mechanisms like legislation reflect only majority rule or the aggregation of current
citizens' preferences. Id.
239 For a discussion of procurement contracts, see notes 67,336-37 and accompanying text.
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contracts on relatively favorable terms, but it does little or nothing to
police whether the government is only purchasing the goods and
services in the first place because the bulk of the costs can be shifted
to the future.
There is another closely related caveat. Procedural requirements
can themselves be a powerful source of entrenchment. At the local
level, environmental review and local land use review processes, like
New York City's Uniform Land Use Review Process2 40 (ULURP),
serve to protect the status quo. Whether they are a source of
entrenchment or protection from entrenchment can simply be a
matter of temporal perspective. But this Article is focused on the
potential political malfunctions that can lead a government to
discount or ignore the costs it is imposing on the future. Procedural
requirements are anti-entrenching to the extent that they ensure some
consideration of those future costs, and ULURP surely does.
The quintessential procedural requirement in this regard is the
National Environmental Policy Act of 19692 (NEPA), and in
particular its state counterparts." They are information-forcing
statutes, requiring governments to produce certain kinds of
information about the long-term consequences of their actions.24 At
the very least, this heightens the visibility and therefore the political
salience of environmental impacts into the future. To the extent that
environmental harms are a form of physical entrenchment through
destruction, NEPA provides procedural, ex ante anti-entrenchment
protection. However, NEPA's requirements have been slowly eroding
since the 1970s.244 Today, governments have become sufficiently adept
at navigating NEPA's requirements that they rarely have to prepare
environmental impact statements, and NEPA's detractors label it
240 See Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, NYC Rules, title 62, §§ 2-01-2-10 (detailing
procedural requirements, such as administrative approval and permits, for land and property
improvements).
241 Pub L No 91-190,83 Stat 852, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 4321-47.
242 See New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, NY Envir Conserv Law
§ 8-0101 (McKinney); California Environmental Quality Act, Cal Pub Resources Code Ann
H§ 21000-21177 (West). See also Valerie M. Fogleman, Guide to the National Environmental
Policy Act: Interpretations, Applications, and Compliance 213-42 (Quorum 1990).
243 A government must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) upon a finding of
environmental impact. See 42 USC § 4332(C). See also William S. Eubanks II, Damage Done?
The Status of NEPA after Winter v. NRDC and Answers to Lingering Questions Left Open by the
Court, 33 Vt L Rev 649,650 (2009) (describing the statute).
244 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 Colum L Rev 903,906-07 (2002).
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"toothless" Its anti-entrenchment function is clear, but its effectiveness,
increasingly, is not.
Table 2 captures some of the examples from Parts II and III and
also illustrates graphically what forms of anti-entrenchment
protection apply.
TABLE 2. ENTRENCHMENT PROTECTION
Mechanism Examples Ex Post Protection Ex Ante Procedural
Prohibition Protection
Contract Promises to forbear Breach; Inalienable
Failure to enforce powers
Procurement contracts Breach Inalienable
powers
Development Eminent domain Detailed in
agreements enabling
statute
Property Creating rights, Eminent domain; Public trust
future interests, Failure to enforce
and alienating assets
Finance Debt Chapter 9 Debt limits Bond elections






D. Entrenchment on the Rise
Together, Parts II and III demonstrate a clear, albeit not
universal, trend toward greater opportunities for entrenchment. Local
governments have become more creative at finding ways to
circumvent traditional anti-entrenchment protection, while both
courts and legislatures have scaled back core de-entrenching
245 See, for example, Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of
Information Policy, 89 Iowa L Rev 495,517 (2004):
[Tihe Court has so thoroughly circumscribed NEPA that the statute has come to exemplify
"soft look" review in administrative law at large. So toothless are the Court's admonitions
that federal agencies should take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of their
decisions that no other interpretation of this phrase would be accurate.
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mechanisms. From the increasing use of long-term contracts,
sophisticated property conveyancing, and development agreements, to
monetizing future income streams, statutorily defined vested rights,
and recently enacted limits on eminent domain, governments have
many more ways to make precommitments more binding into the
future than they ever had before. The reason appears partly to be
inadvertence and lack of attention to entrenchment concerns, and
perhaps blindness to long-term costs. The trend is nevertheless clear
enough that it is useful to ask, "Why now?"m2 Although it is difficult to
know with certainty, two kinds of positive explanations seem
particularly likely: increased interlocal competition and increased
volatility in local preferences. Both possibilities are considered briefly
in turn, and they serve as a useful segue into a more theoretical
inquiry about the costs and benefits of entrenchment.
1. Interlocal competition.
Entrenchment may be on the rise from increased competition
between local governments for mobile capital and high-valued uses.m
Local governments and local officials generally try to attract
businesses and residents that contribute more in property taxes than
they consume.244 Wealthy empty nesters, commercial office space, and
some kinds of light industry, for example, are all likely to be net
winners for a community. Their contribution to the local property tax
base outstrips the costs they impose, whether in consumption of
services, congestion, environmental impacts, or some other currency.249
These uses (and users) are in contrast to poor families with multiple
school-age children or classic LULUs (locally unwanted land uses)
like hazardous waste facilities or drug treatment centers. Typically,
these are believed by government officials to consume more resources
or impose greater harms than the benefits that they contribute
through property taxes or in-kind benefits.2so As a result, local
governments compete with one another over the high-valued uses and
seek to keep out the low-valued ones.
246 I have to thank Greg Alexander for pushing me to think more closely about this issue.
247 See The Second War Between the States, Bus Wk 92 (May 17, 1976), quoted in Peter D.
Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives
for Business, 110 Harv L Rev 377,401 & n 125 (1996).
248 See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law:Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection,
107 Colum L Rev 883, 900 & n 76 (2007); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 Stan L Rev 1115,1134 (1996).
249 See Schragger, 94 Va L Rev at 1148-49 (cited in note 128); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 Colum L Rev 473,512-13 (1991).
250 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 900 (cited in note 248).
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That competition takes many forms. The classic account is the
famous Tiebout hypothesis, which suggests that local governments
compete with each other for residents by offering different
combinations of services and property taxes.251 But the competition has
increasingly taken more aggressive and more creative forms as well.
Offers to assemble land for a developer, combined with tax breaks
and other forms of direct and indirect incentives, are the stock and
trade of public-private bargaining. Still, as noted above, one of the
principal risks that any developer or investor in a municipality faces is
the risk of regulatory change. It may well be, then, that as interlocal
competition over mobile capital and desirable residents has increased,
so too has the demand for new tools for competing, like the ability to
make binding precommitments into the future. Indeed, at least some
of the recent changes in the law-like the invention of development
agreements -are explicable in precisely these terms.
2. Volatility in preferences.
An alternative explanation for the rise in entrenchment is
increased volatility in policy preferences. When policy preferences are
relatively stable over time, any particular government may have little
motivation to try to control the future. But if policy preferences are
volatile, so that the work of one government is more likely to be
undone by the next, then the incentive to create binding policy
precommitments goes up, too."
It is, of course, a recurring theme of national politics that political
polarization is increasing2 - The transition from George Bush to
Barack Obama was marked by dramatic reversals in domestic and
foreign policy."' Indeed, it is these kinds of national issues that have
251 See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 64 J Pol Econ 416,
419-20 (1956). Of course, the Tiebout hypothesis is principally concerned with sorting, explaining
how efficiencies are created as residents sort themselves into communities that share similar
preferences. See id at 418.
252 See Schwartz, Note, 28 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 720 (cited in note 80) ("A development
agreement is a solution to the inherent uncertainty in the development process and a means by
which developers can protect their investment.").
253 See W. Mark Crain and Timothy J. Muris, Legislative Organization of Fiscal Policy, 38 J
L & Econ 311, 321 (1995) ("[Divided government or reversals in party control tend to
discourage interest-group demands because once enacted, laws are less likely to survive beyond
the term of the regime currently in power.").
254 See Dana Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, Partisans without Constraint: Political
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 Am J Socio 408,410 (2008).
255 See, for example, Ved P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United States'
"War on Terror," 37 Denver J Intl L & Policy 513, 515-33 (2009) (discussing President Barack
Obama's quick reversal of President George Bush's counterterrorism policies); Michael J. Kelly,
Charting America's Return to Public International Law under the Obama Administration, 3 J Natl
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dominated previous writing on the entrenchment problem.256 As it
turns out, the same problem is repeated at the local level, too, though
the sources of policy volatility are somewhat less obvious.
While national politics have become increasingly polarized, state
and local politics are an entirely different beast. In fact, in recent
years, so-called red states have generally grown redder, and blue states
bluer, suggesting greater intrastate stability in policy preferences."'
The same is true at the local level, where local governments have also
become more politically homogenous over time.258 This trend toward
increased political homogeneity, coupled with the nonpartisan nature
of many local issues (and elections), suggests that local governments
are safe from the polarization infecting national politics."'
It is not just political polarization that can lead to policy variance
over time, however. In fact, at the local level, the more likely cause will
be real or perceived demographic shifts. Newcomers herald a threat of
new policies and priorities, even if their general political proclivities
are consistent with current residents', and an existing government may
well seek to entrench its decisions in the face of demographic change.
Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the pressure of
demographic changes on local policy preferences may be increasing.
First, and most obviously, domestic migration can quickly alter
the population of a community. While domestic mobility rates in the
aggregate have declined throughout the twentieth century, patterns of
internal migration have resulted in significant transitions in many
parts of the country, especially the Sunbelt.2 Even if mobility is on the
Sec L & Policy 239, 244 (2009) (discussing President Barack Obama's reversal of President
George Bush's Guantanamo Bay policies); Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and Helene Cooper,
Obama Reverses Key Bush Security Policies, NY Times A16 (Jan 22,2009); Scott Wilson, Obama
Reverses Bush Policy on Stem Cell Research: The Ban on Federal Funding Is Lifted, Wash
Post A10 (Mar 10, 2009) (pointing out that the executive order removing the ban "marks the
third time in [Obama's] administration that Obama has reversed Bush-era policies"). Of course,
not all of these early reversals have stuck.
256 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1694-1701 (cited in note 2)
(describing the entrenchment effects of legislation regarding the definition of marriage, federal
budget deficits, and the Senate's cloture rule).
257 See William A. Gaiston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L
Rev 307,312-15 (2008) (citing evidence for deeper polarization within the states).
258 Bill Bishop, The Schism in U.S. Politics Begins at Home, Austin Am-Statesman Al
(Apr 4,2004) ("[Pjolitical segregation in U.S. counties grew by 47 percent from 1976 to 2000.").
259 Cindy Simon Rosenthal, Local Politics:A Different Front in the Culture War, 3 Forum 1,
4 (2005), online at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art5 (visited Jan 9, 2011). There may
be an important exception for land use issues where conflict between pro-growth developers and
anti-growth residents appears to be on the rise. Consider Kenneth A. Stahl, The Artifice of Local
Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial Review, 94 Marq L Rev 1,
19-46 (2010) (offering case studies examining political polarization in local growth politics).
260 See US Census Bureau, Annual Geographical Mobility Rates, By Type of Movement:
1947-2009 table A-1 (2010), online at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-
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decline nationally, certain regions, states, or communities facing
increased demographic pressures may well drive demand for greater
policy control into the future. This is undoubtedly exacerbated by new
patterns of foreign migration into smaller towns and suburbs.261
Generational shifts are the second reason policy variance may be
increasing. The political power of baby boomers in local governments
262
may well be at or even past its zenith. Control over local
governments is therefore shifting away from baby boomers, who have
largely dominated local politics for years.26 Suspicion that the next
generation does not share their values and priorities may therefore
motivate baby boomers to lock in policies before their power
disappears entirely.
It is difficult to know with certainty what is behind the increase in
opportunities for local entrenchment, but both interlocal competition
and increased policy variance appear to be likely candidates.
Regardless of their explanatory power, these observations also
provide a lens through which to analyze the more conceptual costs
and benefits of local precommitments, a topic taken up next.
IV ENTRENCHMENT. WHY AND WHEN
Given the examples in Part II, it appears that governments
frequently act in ways that limit future governments' choices. How
much is too much? Formally unrepealable legislation is impermissible.
But government actions that are the close functional equivalent
appear to be uncontroversial. Are they really? Fundamentally, it
should depend on whether the benefit to a government from entering
into a binding precommitment exceeds the costs that it is imposing on
a-1.pdf (visited Mar 22, 2011) (demonstrating mobility rates). See also Lynda L. Butler, The
Pathology of Property Norms: Living within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S Cal L Rev 927, 954-55
(2000); Joseph P. Ferrie, Internal Migration, in Susan B. Carter, et al, eds, 1 Historical Statistics of
the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, 1-489, 1-492 (Cambridge 2003) (describing the
western and southern migration of whites since the 1940s and the northern migration of African
Americans during the same period).
261 See B. Lindsay Lowell and Micah Bump, The New Settlers: Characteristics of Immigrant
Minority Population Growth in the Nineties, 9 Georgetown Pub Pol Rev 1, 2-3 (2004)
(demonstrating that immigrants are moving to rural states and small local communities where
they had not previously settled); Muzaffar A. Chishti, Enforcing Immigration Rules: Making the
Right Choices, 10 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 451, 464 (2007) (finding that the rate of foreign
immigration has increased, with the majority of immigrants now settling in the suburbs, as
opposed to the traditional gateway urban areas).
262 See Luis Estevez, When Baby Boomers Retire, 84 Pub Mgmt 3,4 (Oct 2004) (suggesting
that baby boomers are currently in the majority of leadership positions at the local level);
P. Michael Pauls, New and Valuable: University Partnerships, 89 Pub Mgmt 18,18 (Nov 2007).
263 See Ralph Blumenthal, Unfilled City Manager Positions Hint at Future Government Gap,
NY Times Al (Jan 11, 2007) (describing the demographic gap in leadership positions in
municipal government).
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the future. Or, more specifically, as this Part shows, it should depend
on whether inducing reliance on a government precommitment is
more valuable than the harm that is likely to result from a loss of
flexibility in the future.
Admittedly, there are a number of different ways to talk about
the relative costs and benefits of entrenchment. Entrenchment, at the
end of the day, implicates core democratic values, and it may be that
limits on the temporal scope of government actions are implied by the
nature of sovereignty. It would be possible to frame the question
differently and ask, for example, whether a government has acted in a
way that inappropriately co-opts sovereignty from the future. Or, one
could focus on the legislative process itself and examine the effect of
entrenchment on the incentives of government actors and the internal
dynamics of governments.26 There are, in other words, multiple
normative accounts that could be developed here.
This Part puts these broad political theory concerns largely to the
side. The analysis that follows takes a very different-and largely
utilitarian -tack. It focuses as specifically as possible on the concrete
costs and benefits of a government locking policy into the future.
There are situations in which allowing a government to make a
binding precommitment will objectively benefit the public, and other
situations in which it will do the opposite. This Part seeks to provide
an overall framework for evaluating entrenchment, first by identifying
its costs and benefits, and then by exploring how to compare them.
This approach also generates some immediate doctrinal payoffs. By
way of foreshadowing, Part V puts this Part's analytical framework to
the test and offers some illustrative takeaways.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Entrenchment
The ability to entrench a policy can create significant public
benefits, principally in the ability to induce reliance by private parties,
but it also comes with substantial risks that deals will go bad or that
policy preferences will change. In the face of these competing
considerations, it is easy but empty to suggest that government
precommitments should be enforceable to the extent that the benefits
outweigh the costs. The real analytical work comes from identifying
specifically what those costs and benefits really are, how they should
264 See, for example, Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 262-79 (cited in note 5) (providing an
account of the legislative incentives surrounding temporary legislation); Daryl J. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657,
681-91 (2011). See also generally Eskridge and Ferejohn, 80 Georgetown L J 523 (cited in
note 4).
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be compared, and whether governments should be trusted to make
the comparison.
1. Costs.
The overriding cost of entrenchment is, quite simply, the loss of
future flexibility.265 To be precise, the cost of entrenchment is the
opportunity cost created by the entrenching government action; it is
the difference between the value of the entrenched policy and the
preferred policy in the future. Entrenchment is no problem in this
Article's utilitarian framework if future governments would stay the
course even if change were costless.
The loss of flexibility can therefore create costs in three distinct
scenarios: when the world turns out differently than the government
anticipated, when subsequent governments' preferences change over
time, or when a government deliberately imposes costs on the future
to reap some immediate benefit. For example, imagine that a
government seeks to induce a private developer to incur the clean-up
costs for some brownfield development in exchange for favorable
261
zoning treatment in the future. That bargain might turn out to be a
bad one for the government. New residential development nearby, the
presence of newly endangered species, or discoveries about the
adverse health effects of lingering contamination may alter the cost to
the public of living up to its earlier precommitment. The promising
265 The importance of flexibility is well known. Consider Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 667
(cited in note 51) ("Tension inevitably develops between the desire to provide sufficient
contractual specificity to enable meaningful monitoring and the temptation to leave terms
flexible enough to allow adaptations in light of changing conditions."). But see David Super,
Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L Rev *22-35 (forthcoming 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1675225 (visited Mar 24, 2011) (arguing that flexibility imposes
costs of its own).
266 See Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev at 351-54 (cited in note 7).
267 Examples like this are legion. In Beverly, Massachusetts, the city partnered with Boston-
based Cummings Properties to transform a former industrial site into a retail and office park.
See Emma Johnson, Fields of Vision: New England States Revitalize Potentially Toxic Properties,
72 J Prop Mgmt 12, 13 (Nov/Dec 2007). The developer spent $65 million cleaning up the site in
exchange for a ten-year tax abatement and a special designation for the site to make it eligible
for beneficial state tax treatment as well. See id; Regina Raiford, Industrial Revolutions,
94 Buildings 28, 30-31 (Apr 2000); Ada Louise Huxtable, Refitting "The Shoe," Wall St J A20
(Oct 2, 1997). Also, through the Massachusetts Brownfields Initiatives law, Cummings signed an
agreement with the state that allowed them to clean up the site without bearing the risk of future
legal liability. See Huxtable, Refitting "The Shoe," Wall St J at A20. See also Mass Gen Laws Ann
ch 21E, § 3(A)(j)(1) (West 2010) (permitting the commonwealth to enter into agreements
foreclosing future liability for brownfield management if the agreements are in the public
interest). For another example, see Betsy Giusto, Edgewater: The Power of Public-Private
Partnerships, 6 Econ Dev J 30,30-33 (Winter 2007) (describing a public-private partnership to
redevelop an industrial site in Webster, Texas, that involved municipal rezoning of the property
to permit the planned unit development).
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government may, in other words, have simply guessed wrong about the
cost of its promise. Were it possible to go back in time and ask the
original government actors-or their constituents-whether they still
favor entering into the obligation in light of this new information, they
presumably would say no.
Alternatively, policy preferences may shift over time, even if the
world turns out as expected. That is, even with perfect foresight, the
original government would still select the same policy. The problem is
simply that preferences have changed. The government in the future is
not the same as the government in the past, and the plans and
priorities of its constituents may well have shifted.
Finally, the deal may have been a bad one from the outset,
reflecting a naked giveaway to a private developer, but with the costs
borne in the future. In these cases, there is simply a disagreement
between the policy preferences at two different times.
In each scenario, the government in the future is stuck with the
costs of the earlier government's actions. That later government may
well want to adopt a different set of policies, whether a different
zoning ordinance, a different level of debt, or any of the other myriad
policies that an earlier government can in fact entrench through
private law. The cost, then, is the marginal difference between the
entrenched policy decision and the preferred policy decision later on.
2. Benefits.
The principal benefit of government precommitments and their
resulting entrenchment is the ability to induce reliance.2" At the most
general level, stability in government policy can allow private citizens
to organize their lives around expectations about future regulations.
The more stability there is, the more people can make investments of
time and money in reliance on their expectations about the future.
This theoretical benefit is entirely consistent with the positive claim
made above that entrenchment may be increasing in response to
269interlocal competition over mobile capital.
There are important reasons, sounding in moral hazard, to doubt
the appropriateness of broadly immunizing property owners from the
268 Posner and Vermeule identify and catalogue a broader set of benefits. Several, though,
are versions of reliance. Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1670-73 (cited in note 2). Those
benefits that are not versions of reliance are more directly concerned with the internal dynamics
of political decisionmaking, a consequence explicitly set aside in this Article. See text
accompanying note 264.
269 See Part III.D.
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risk of regulatory change.270 Regardless of whether and to what extent
stability is an appropriate goal for a regulatory regime as a general
matter, it can undoubtedly create benefits in specific situations. If a
government wants someone to extend credit, provide long-term goods
or services, or otherwise act in reliance on a government
precommitment, then that obligation must somehow be binding in the
future."'
To frame the point in the negative instead of the positive: the
inability of a government to make binding precommitments can make
it difficult and more expensive for governments to secure benefits
from private parties. If the government cannot bind itself, then
promisees will have to discount the value of government promises,
raising the prices that the public has to pay.27 This, of course, translates
directly into higher costs to the public. In the brownfield development
example above, unless the developer has some assurance of receiving
zoning benefits down the road, it may well be unwilling to incur the
upfront cleanup costs as part of the bargain, even though the
arrangement would have been beneficial to both parties."
The same problem arises whenever a government would benefit
from a private party relying on some governmental promise that may
or may not be enforceable.274 If a government wants to induce a private
270 This implicates a more general inquiry into legal transitions and the extent to which it is
appropriate to protect people from the costs of regulatory change. For an argument against such
protection, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv L Rev 509,
551-52 (1986). For an account of reliance as justifying protection, see Joseph William Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan L Rev 611,711-32 (1988).
271 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 929-30 (cited in note 248). A more general version of
this point invokes courts as key players in creating the stability necessary for public-private
bargains. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875,877-79 (1975). See also Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev
at 279 n 119 (cited in note 5).
272 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 915 (cited in note 248). See also Michaels, 77 U Chi L
Rev at 743 (cited in note 63) (noting that the government's ability to avoid a contract "raise[s]
the price of the contract, particularly with respect to contracts for complex services ... that
require substantial initial investments of resources, training, and capital outlays"); Gersen, 74 U
Chi L Rev at 281 (cited in note 5) ("Indeed, long-term bargains may incorporate a greater risk of
legislative defection. However, this risk of future repeal or policy adjustment will simply be
incorporated into the price interests are willing to pay for legislation in the current period.");
Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 699 (cited in note 52) ("When a legislature repudiates a contract, it
demoralizes its contract partners, and that demoralization is likely to make future legislative
contracting-even if efficient-more difficult or expensive.").
273 See text accompanying note 267. See also Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1671-72
(cited in note 2) (describing the benefit to government of inducing reliance).
274 In the private context, this arises whenever one party must make a significant
investment before the full benefits of the contract are even apparent. Then, parties may well
want to precommit to behave in a manner that may turn out to be inefficient in order to achieve
greater efficiency overall. It can include any situation in which there is a "principal-agent
relationship in which the agent is relatively risk-averse and there is a delay between the agent's
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party to provide a public benefit or make some other investment that
requires upfront expenditures and slow repayment, then its
precommitments must be enforceable, at least to some extent."'
Sometimes, of course, a handshake is enough, but the value of the
precommitment to the private party rises and falls with its certainty.
While it is easy enough to identify the generic form of
entrenchment's costs and benefits, the more difficult analytical work
remains: exploring how to compare them in the context of local
governments. This raises three interrelated problems. The first is
political: Should local governments be trusted to decide whether and
how to entrench plans and policies? The second is quite conceptual:
How should immediate benefits and future costs be compared
intertemporally? The third is more prescriptive: How can the benefits
of entrenchment be maximized while minimizing the cost? The first
two are taken in order, and the third constitutes Part V.
B. The Politics of Entrenchment
At the most general level, there is nothing unique about trading
off present benefits against the loss of choice in the future. Any
obligation to future performance-borrowing money, extending or
accepting a dinner invitation -means losing flexibility to make other
plans, or at least incurring costs to change those plans. People
nevertheless make such commitments all the time, presumably
because they are making guesses about their preferences in the future
or are trading off some immediate reward against repayment down
the road.
In the context of private precommitments-say, a long-term
bilateral contract between individuals or corporations- the risk of
bad bets about the future generally falls on the parties themselves. The
law reasonably presumes that both parties will internalize the long-
term costs and benefits of the bargain. If a party believes that the
benefits of a precommitment outweigh its long-term costs, a court
should not interfere (subject, presumably, to the usual kinds of
contract defenses like unconscionability).27 There are, of course,
reasons to doubt that parties to contracts are always making rational
exertion of effort and the realization of value." Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable
Contracts: Another Look at the Law and Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 NYU L
Rev 487,499 (2006), citing Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments:A New Perspective
on Contract Modification, 26 J Legal Stud 203, 211 (1997).
275 Third-party reliance can take a more systemic form, too. Instead of inducing third-party
reliance in any specific way, entrenchment can enable more efficient Tiebout-style sorting and
can therefore unlock property values. See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 895 (cited in note 248).
276 See, for example, Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway v Voigt, 176 US 498,505 (1900).
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bargains in the context of future obligations."' But the fact that a
bargain turns out to have been a costly mistake does not generally
implicate freedom of contract or allow parties to walk away from their
debts. Bad deals are bad deals; there are winners and losers, but the
law generally holds people to their promises.
The important question for entrenchment, then, is whether and to
what extent the same analysis applies to government precommitments.2 8
If the analogy to private contracts holds, then government actors should
be able to precommit to law or policy in the future."' They should, in
other words, be trusted to understand and rationally weigh the costs and
benefits of their actions. In theory, the answer depends on the source of
the costs. Governments and government actors are in the same position
as private parties when the risk they face is the world turning out
differently than expected. Governments make bad bets just like private
actors do. But these cases are, in practice, indistinguishable from those in
which a government precommitment represents an anachronistic policy
commitment or, worse, a deliberate effort to shift costs into the future.
Ultimately, then, government entrenchment should be treated
differently from private precommitments because of the possibility-
indeed, the likelihood-of political malfunction in the context of
intertemporal commitments.280 Government actors face particular
problems representing the interests of the future, and indeed may
have an incentive not to try at all. This is a familiar observation about
agency costs, but dressed up here in a specific and not entirely familiar
277 As one article explains, "The difficulty, which both cognitive psychologists and down-to-
earth estate planners have noticed, is that human persons often forget that they inhabit a
changing world. They tend, perhaps systematically, to underestimate the likelihood that inflexible
provisions for the future, including use restrictions, will fail to suit evolving circumstances."
Adam J. Hirsch and William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind L J 1, 25
(1992) (citing sources).
278 In an interesting treatment, Stewart Sterk and Elizabeth Goldman refer to the problem
as one of "legislative discontinuity." See Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1324 (cited in
note 128). They provide an extended treatment of the difference between the continuity of
individuals and legislatures that applies equally to the analysis here. See id at 1324-29.
279 Posner and Vermeule have, in fact, made precisely this suggestion. See Posner and Vermeule,
111 Yale L J at 1688-90 (cited in note 2) (analogizing statutes to contracts, in the sense that both bind
future actors, and noting that voters have selected Congress to make decisions for them).
280 See, for example, Fischel and Sykes, 1 Am L & Econ Rev at 316 (cited in note 19):
[G]overnment as a contracting party is not equivalent to the private actor. Voluntary
exchange between private parties is presumptively beneficial. The same cannot be said for
exchange between private and governmental actors. As the vast public choice literature
demonstrates. . . much governmental action is best understood as the outcome of successful
rent seeking that benefits well-organized interest groups at the expense of the public at
large, and contracting with the government can be just another form of rent-seeking
behavior.
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form, because there are two layers of agency costs operating
simultaneously.
1. Interest group pressure.
Because governments are agents, there is always the risk that
they may not be acting in the best interests of their constituents even
at the time they adopt a law or policy. 2" As public choice theorists
have demonstrated, government officials may be motivated by their
own self-interest instead of the best interests of their constituents or
the community. This form of agency malfunction is already well
understood.282 The stakes go up dramatically, however, if the decision is
then entrenched against subsequent regulatory change.28 Special
interests already have an incentive to rent seek from the government.
But if government decisions- regulatory forbearance, tax benefits,
and so on-can also be immunized from change, then the value of
rent-seeking also increases, which will induce even more aggressive
special-interest-group pressure.
This would not be conceptually problematic if the stakes rise for
all affected interest groups. While entrenchment creates the possibility
of perpetual benefits, it also creates the reciprocal possibility of
perpetual costs. Affected groups on the other side should, in theory, be
more mobilized, too. In many contexts, however, this relies on an
unrealistically rosy assessment of the political process. Despite the
potential increase in the cost of a government decision, there are
many times when no meaningful interest group is likely to organize on
the other side of an issue. At the time of the precommitment, the costs
may not be sufficiently apparent, the issue may be too esoteric, or the
affected interest groups simply too diffuse or apathetic to generate
much in the way of political opposition."
In the absence of entrenchment, the political process provides
some remedy for these problems. Once the real costs of a government
decision are known, once the burden of a government decision or
policy is actually being felt, affected people can then mobilize and
281 See Part IV.B.2.
282 See, for example, Fischel and Sykes, 1 Am L & Econ Rev at 328 (cited in note 19).
283 For a thoroughgoing account of the problem in the context of regulatory contracts, see
Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 495-502 (cited in note 20) (noting especially that industry
capture can occur in the process of regulating that same industry).
284 See, for example, Super, 118 Harv L Rev at 2621 (cited in note 62):
One of the best ways of overcoming political opponents is to keep them from realizing that
their interests are at risk or, if that fails, to spread the costs of the initiative widely enough
that few will find it worth their while to protest. Pushing the costs of a program into the
future is an excellent way of achieving both goals.
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seek a change. This is quite common at the local level."' But if the
decision is entrenched against change, there is no subsequent political
remedy. The battle, having once been lost, cannot be refought, even if
one side had not really been on the field.
Entrenchment can have additional systemic effects on interest
group incentives. The possibility of revisiting decisions in the future
may in fact prevent interest groups from overreaching in the policy
concessions that they initially seek from the government. The
expected value of any government benefit today must be discounted
by the likelihood of repeal in the future, a likelihood that may increase
as governmental benefits to a special interest group increase. By
aiming too high, an interest group increases the risk of the
government subsequently changing course.m' Clearly, one should not
make too much of this point. Government decisions are often
sufficiently sticky, even without any form of entrenchment identified
here, that interest groups lobby hard for significant concessions or
highly favorable treatment up front. Nevertheless, if government
decisions can be effectively entrenched into the future, even that thin
constraint disappears. In short, there is good reason to worry that
entrenched policies will be the product of special-interest-group
pressure and not reflect genuinely good bargains for the public.
2. Intertemporal agency costs.
This familiar agency problem is even more pronounced in the
context of public entrenchment because government actors are
temporary agents for principals who also change over time."' Even if
government officials believed they were acting in the best interests of
their future constituents when they entered into a precommitment, it
would be hard for them to anticipate who those constituents will be,
let alone what their preferences will be in the future." Later on,
285 See Margolis v District Court, 638 P2d 297, 306 (Colo 1981) (upholding the power of
Colorado's citizens to review rezoning decisions of municipal governments through referenda
elections). See also Jonathan S. Paris, Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning, 29 Stan L
Rev 819,823-24 (1974).
286 The recent health care debate is an example of this, in which opponents threatened that
the passage of certain proposals would lead to a concerted repeal effort by future Congresses.
See Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, Money and Institutional Power, 77 Tex L
Rev 1673,1703 (1999).
287 See, for example, Michaels, 77 U Chi L Rev at 732-33 & n 56 (cited in note 63) (noting
the intergenerational problem of agency costs); Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 660 (cited in note 52)
("[T]he principals of the legislature-as-agent shift over time.").
288 See Sterk, 88 Colum L Rev at 708-09 (cited in note 52) ("[Hjuman frailty limits the
capacity of any decisionmaker ... to appreciate the preferences of those to come and the moral
claim the unborn exert upon the living."); Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev at 353 (cited in note 7).
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deferring to the earlier government's decision is, in some sense,
reifying the preferences of a polity that no longer even exists.
The decision to enter into a precommitment should involve
evaluating-at least implicitly-the tradeoff between the benefit of
inducing reliance today and the loss of flexibility in the future. If the
government's end of the bargain is not due until sometime after the
next election, however, then current politicians may externalize the
costs of the regulatory giveaway on to future politicians. Imagine that
rezoning a brownfield for residential development, for example, is
politically unpopular. In theory, deferring the legislation and instead
promising to rezone the property in the future should also be
unpopular. In reality, though, the political costs may be shifted into the
future if the rezoning does not become salient to most constituents
until it is more imminent. A promise to rezone sometime in the future
simply may not arouse voter attention, let alone ire, the way an
immediate rezoning sometimes will.
This may be true either because voters' interest and attention is
more likely to be tuned in where the effects of a decision are more
imminent, or simply because voters' preferences change over time.
Today's constituents may value development on the brownfield;
tomorrow's may not.' But if politicians anticipate leaving office
before any of the possible costs come home to roost, a
precommitment today may generate few of the political pressures that
actually line up against the decision, albeit across generations.290
289 The obligation of current governments to take into account the costs to the future
remains a contested theoretical issue with enormous stakes, particularly in the environmental
arena. For some leading treatments, see Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, Retaking
Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 10
(Oxford 2008); Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars Discounting Lives: Intergenerational
Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79, 80-82 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein and Arden
Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U
Chi L Rev 171, 174 (2007). This Article assumes that it is appropriate to take future interests into
account, but is agnostic regarding the difficult questions about discount rates and other points
of contention between Richard Revesz and Cass Sunstein, in particular. Compare Revesz
and Livermore, Retaking Rationality at 117, with Sunstein and Rowell, 74 U Chi L Rev
at 172-73, 181. See also Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore Distant-Future Generations,
74 U Chi L Rev 139, 139-42 (2007) (distinguishing between intertemporal equity and efficiency
and suggesting a steep discount rate).
290 Some might object to this whole discussion because agency costs are hardly unique to
governments. Indeed, precommitments by corporate officers may raise some of the same sets of
issues, if the costs of some precommitment or promise can be shifted far out into the future. In
fact, however, corporations come with the additional protection that their ultimate responsibility
to maximize shareholder value ensures a continuity of interests over time that governments do
not share. Consider Ronald Cass, Privatization: Politics Law, and Theory, 71 Marq L Rev 449,
483 (1988) ("Public enterprises .. .seldom possess a single or a clear goal.").
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Of course, the likelihood of a government shifting costs into the
future is at least partly dependent on political conditions. Politicians
who, for whatever reason, expect to serve extremely long terms cannot
pass costs on to future politicians as easily. In small local governments,
with few demographic pressures and relatively stable preferences, the
opportunity for local politicians to externalize costs on to the future
also appears relatively small. Homeowners dominate many suburban
and small-town governments. They not only wield considerable
control over local decisionmaking, but they are also generally united
in their interest in preserving local property values.291 There is little
opportunity to shift costs into the future if those costs are capitalized
into property values."' And even if that is not true -even if the market
is not so sensitive to the long-term policy commitments of local
governments-residents themselves may well anticipate bearing the
future costs of government actions because homeowners move less
often than others.293 In communities with less stable populations and
preferences -larger municipalities, or towns or suburbs facing
demographic shifts -this political feedback largely disappears.
3. Preventing future political malfunction.
Arguably, the politics of entrenchment can cut both ways.
Entrenching decisions can be the product of political malfunction, but
they can also be used to limit future political malfunctions. For
example, political conditions today might be majoritarian and
democratically responsive. But, faced with the possibility of a new
economic or political powerhouse coming into town-a developer, or
a chain store with a sophisticated land use apparatus-a local
government may well seek to prevent special-interest-group capture
in the future by acting to entrench decisions today.m
In its general form, this motivation is entirely consistent with
traditional examples from personal or private precommitments. Why
does someone lock his cigarettes in a drawer?295 If he knows today that
291 See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis at 4 (cited in note 41); Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev
at 945 (cited in note 248).
292 See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis at 39-57 (cited in note 41) (discussing capitalization).
293 See id at 15 (discussing homeowners as a dominant political force); Lee Anne Fennell
and Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U Chi L Rev 143, 144 (2010) ("[Ajlthough
local governments may want to control the size and shape of residential stakes, existing
stakeholders currently control local government policy.").
294 This resembles the justification for poison pills and other antitakeover devices in
corporate law that are designed to protect current shareholders from future attempts to capture
shareholders' voting power.
295 The image more typically invoked to convey this idea is Odysseus lashing himself to the
mast. See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum
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smoking is not in his best interests, can he not count on his future
selves to make the same rational calculation?2% The answer, of course,
is no. He may well lock the cigarettes away, sell the television, hide the
credit cards, or throw away the cake in a moment of strength, rightly
anticipating future moments of weakness. This is directly analogous to
using entrenchment to prevent future government actions that almost
everyone opposes but that, because of political malfunctions like
collective action problems, monitoring costs, agency capture, and the
like, might actually be hard to stop.297
It can also be the product of less benign efforts simply to assert
policy preferences into the future, however. Imagine that a
government owns (or has regulatory authority over) an undeveloped
and environmentally sensitive piece of land that some interest group
nevertheless wants to develop. The government can, of course, choose
simply not to permit the property to be developed on its watch. This
will reserve the same choice to future governments: permit
development or not. So why might a government go one step further
and seek to entrench its preference for conservation?
One likely explanation comes from mistrust of future policies and
preferences. If the government today could count on future
governments to recognize and appreciate the value of conservation,
then it would expect those future governments not to develop or
otherwise harm the property either (unless conditions truly changed
so that conservation was no longer appropriate or necessary).
Attempts to entrench conservation -perhaps by conveying
conservation easements -therefore manifest an implicit assumption
that future governments cannot be trusted to protect the property
adequately.' The government today is essentially asserting that it is
L Rev 606,655-56 & n 198 (2008), citing Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality
and Irrationality (Cambridge 1979).
296 Levinson, 124 Hary L Rev at 672 (cited in note 264). See also Derek Parfit, Reasons and
Persons 158-63 (Oxford 1984). Jeremy Waldron offers a nuanced account that uses as one
example a drinker giving his car keys to a friend at a party. Waldron, Law and Disagreement
at 259 (cited in note 42). As this example makes clear, the precommitment can simply be to
allocate future decisionmaking authority to someone else-a sober friend, the courts, and so
forth. For general purposes here, little turns on the distinction, but Waldron's nuanced treatment
demonstrates even more heterogeneity in the category of entrenchment.
297 These are some of the typical causes of principal-agent problems in the context of
government decisionmaking. See, for example, Matthew C. Stephenson and Howell E. Jackson,
Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 Hary J
Legis 1, 20 (2010) ("[I]ncomplete information and imperfect monitoring may create a principal-
agent problem between lobbyists and the constituencies they represent and advise.").
298 See, for example, Waldron, Law and Disagreement at 221-22 (cited in note 42):
[The attitude of constitutional entrenchment] is best summed up as a combination of self-
assurance and mistrust: self-assurance in the proponent's conviction that what he is putting
forward really is a matter of fundamental right ... ; and mistrust, implicit in his view that
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likely to be better at appreciating the "real" value of conservation
than future governments and is using entrenchment to lock that
valuation into the future.
Unfortunately, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether a
government action is preventing a political malfunction in the future or
is an intergenerational power grab. One government's policy judgments
may simply differ from the next one's. Predictable demographic
changes may lead to foreseeable shifts in preferences, but these are
hardly political "malfunctions." Governments undoubtedly engage in
good faith efforts to lock in policies in order to prevent what they
perceive to be political malfunctions in the future, but this is largely
indistinguishable from efforts to lock in policy simply for the sake of
preventing change. Indeed, this impulse is consistent with the idea that
the desirability of entrenchment increases with the variance in policy
preferences over time.299 Therefore, despite the theoretical appeal,
preventing future political malfunction is not a benefit that justifies
entrenchment in the real world because it is too hard to distinguish
from a naked attempt to assert preferences into the future.
In conclusion, there are good reasons to worry that governments
will not weigh the costs and benefits of entrenchment appropriately.
With the possibility of agency malfunction, government actors may
well make promises that generate disproportionate future harm, given
the immediate gain. Before offering solutions, however, a prior
question remains: How should these costs and benefits be compared
intertemporally?
C. Comparing Entrenchment's Costs and Benefits Ex Ante
Allowing a government to make binding precommitments can
generate benefits for that government, but can also impose costs into
the future. Superficially, this looks like a version of any bilateral
interaction where parties have different preferences. If the benefits at
Time 1 outweigh the costs at Time 2, then the entrenching action
should be permitted, and otherwise not. The problem here is that the
parties-the entrenching and the subsequent governments -never
exist simultaneously. This creates a somewhat complex choice about
any alternative conception that might be concocted by elected legislators next year or in ten
years' time is so likely to be wrong-headed or ill-motivated that his own formulation is to
be elevated immediately beyond the reach of ordinary legislative revisions.
A slightly less paternalistic account acknowledges that future governments may actually
appreciate the conservation if it prevents certain political fights from forming in the first place.
In this way, conservation can function like a shark repellant in corporate law, keeping the sharks
from even taking an interest. See Serkin, 77 U Chi L Rev at 350 (cited in note 7).
299 See Part III.D.
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the temporal perspective to adopt when evaluating an entrenching
government action.
There is a burgeoning academic literature on the problem of
intergenerational equity.30 Typically, this focuses on obligations that
current generations owe to the future. For entrenchment, the temporal
perspective is reversed: How should today's generations value the
preferences of the past? This puts a surprising twist on the problem of
intergenerational equity and presents a neat conceptual problem in
thinking about how to compare costs and benefits across time.
It is possible to interpret anti-entrenchment rules to mean simply
that the law prioritizes the preferences of the present over those of
the past. But this proves either too much or too little. Taken literally, it
would mean that precommitments could never bind future
governments. That is both doctrinally and normatively implausible, as
even medium-term contracts would therefore be unenforceable, to
name just one consequence. But, taken less than literally, it reveals
nothing about how to decide when a precommitment takes too much
away from the future.
It is therefore helpful to consider the problem in the more
familiar context of the law of wills and trusts. One of the deep
theoretical issues animating that area of law is the ability of a testator
to control the disposition of her property after her death (dubbed
"dead hand control"'). Gregory Alexander, in evaluating the history
of the dead hand in nineteenth-century trust law, described how early
theorists objected to dead-hand control on grounds that it restrained
alienability. Any restriction imposed on property today reduces
people's freedom in the future to do with it what they want. As people
grew more sophisticated in their thinking about the problem, however,
they began to recognize that limiting dead-hand control actually
increased the alienability of property from the perspective of the
beneficiary but restricted it from the perspective of the grantor (or
settlor). 3 That is, increasing dead-hand control removes power from
beneficiaries, but decreasing dead-hand control removes power from
the grantor.o' This, of course, is the same fundamental conflict that
entrenchment presents: increasing the power of an earlier government
to entrench its policies decreases the power of subsequent
governments to decide policy for themselves.
300 See note 289.
301 Lewis M. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 3 (Michigan Law 1955).
302 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century,37 Stan L Rev 1189,1198 (1985).
303 See Hirsch and Wang, 68 Ind L J at 19-20 (cited in note 277).
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Over the course of hundreds of years, courts have frequently had
to decide, in the context of trusts and estates, whether to uphold a
testator's property-use restriction that living beneficiaries want to
invalidate." If a testator leaves Blackacre to her heirs so long as no
liquor is served on the premises, should that restriction be enforced
against a beneficiary who wants to open a wine bar? In its general
form, the problem arises whenever a grantor encumbers property to
reflect a set of preferences at odds with those of the beneficiaries. A
beneficiary might prefer to serve wine, sell the family homestead,
spend the corpus of her inheritance, or otherwise use her property in a
way that conflicts with what the grantor preferred."' What to do?
One misleading way to view tradeoffs is as a static example
where the goal is simply to give the legal entitlement to the party who
values it more. In the conflict between testators and beneficiaries, one
might be tempted to think that the stronger preference should win
out. If it is more important to the testator that a restriction on
property remain in place than it is to the beneficiary that the
restriction be lifted, then the restriction should be enforced, and
otherwise not.6 The grantor may not really have cared about the sale
of liquor, and the beneficiary may desperately want to open a bar.
In fact, however, failing to enforce some dead-hand restriction
over property has no meaningful effect on the welfare of the testator
who is, after all, dead. It is not welfare enhancing to follow the
preferences of someone who has no welfare to be enhanced.
Therefore, the problem of dead-hand control cannot be resolved by
reference to the relative strength of the particular parties' actual
preferences. The living beneficiary has preferences; the dead testator
does not.
The utilitarian concern with dead-hand control, then, is the
systemic effect on future testators. Indeed, one of the strongest
justifications for respecting dead-hand control is an extension of the
principal justification for testamentary freedom more broadly: it
encourages industry and thrift during life."' If people knew that their
wishes for their property would not be enforced after death, then they
304 See, for example, Shapira v Union National Bank, 315 NE2d 825, 832 (Ohio Ct Com
Pleas 1974) (upholding a will requiring the beneficiary to marry a Jewish woman); In re Estate of
Brown, 528 A2d 752, 755 (Vt 1987) (refusing to terminate a trust despite the wishes of the
beneficiaries).
305 Hirsch and Wang, 68 Ind L J at 19 (cited in note 277).
306 Id at 20 ("[A] use restriction is of efficient duration where the marginal benefit to the
testator of extending the restriction ... equals the marginal benefit to the beneficiary and to
society of terminating the restriction.").
307 Id at 7-8; Josh Tate, Perpetual Trust and the Settlor's Intent, 53 U Kan L Rev 595, 624
(2004) (citing sources).
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would have little incentive to accumulate and preserve wealth toward
the end of their lives. Testamentary freedom and dead-hand control
offset those pressures. By increasing the marginal value of property
retained at the time of death, people have an added incentive to
accumulate and to save.
This relates directly to the problem of entrenchment. A
subsequent government-occupying a position similar to a beneficiary
in a testamentary trust-has no opportunity to go back in time to
bargain with an earlier government (analogous to the grantor) over
the temporal scope of a plan or policy.0 But as the analogy to dead-
hand control makes clear, the issue should not be resolved by asking
whether the precommitment was worth more to the entrenching
government than getting out of the precommitment is worth to the
government seeking to escape its restrictions. The concern, instead, is
with the systemic effects in the future if governments either can or
cannot entrench laws and policies. In other words, the problem should
not be viewed ex post, comparing the value of the entrenchment to
the original and the subsequent government, but instead ex ante,
focusing on the effect on future governments."
The key is to recognize that every government is simultaneously a
present and future government vis-A-vis others in time. That is to say, a
government inherits earlier governments' precommitments but
benefits from being able to make precommitments of its own. The
question, in the abstract, should then be how much power government
actors, in general, want to have to control the future, knowing that it
means accepting the thick cords of preexisting obligations.o
Framing the question this way might seem to recreate the
problem at one higher level of abstraction. When different
government actors have different preferences about the ability to bind
the future, whose should win, the past's or the present's? In fact,
though, this framing suggests some general outline of the limits of
308 This inability to bargain is a central justification for treating wills and testamentary
trusts differently than traditional contracts and gratuitous promises. See Richard A. Posner,
Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law,6 J Legal Stud 411,413-14 (1977).
309 Consider Gillette, 78 BU L Rev at 830-31 (cited in note 45) (describing the benefits to
current legislators of adhering to past bargains, such as a reputation for reliability that would
allow the legislator to exact higher rents); Dana and Koniak, 148 U Pa L Rev at 518 (cited in
note 20) ("To deter capture and compromise contracts, it is necessary for the parties to believe at
the time the contract is formed that a court would be able to tell whether the contract reflects
capture or compromise more than opportunism protection.").
310 This could be framed in terms of some Rawlsian veil of ignorance: If a government did
not know whether it was the entrenching or the entrenched government, would it, in the abstract,
embrace the enforceability of a particular precommitment? See John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 12 (Belknap 1971). See also Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional
Law, 111 Yale L J 399,399 (2001).
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entrenchment, even if precise line drawing will necessarily remain
elusive. There is presumably some level of government control over
the future that virtually all government actors would want. Every
government benefits from the power to enter into some kinds of
contracts or issue some amount of debt, even if it means being bound
by predecessors' actions in those regards. More generally, every
government actor would like to be able to generate the benefits of
inducing third-party reliance, at least where the costs are not too high.
But when are the costs too high?
Trusts and estates is again a useful place to turn to begin to
answer the question. Scholars in that field have recognized that there
is no "right" answer to the problem of dead-hand control."' Increasing
alienability for the settlor decreases it for the beneficiaries. But the
law also appears to recognize that the value of dead-hand control
decreases over time while its costs inevitably rise.312 That is, a testator
may care deeply that property remains in the family for the next fifty
years, less so for the following fifty, and be relatively indifferent to the
fifty after that. Simultaneously, the interests of beneficiaries in freeing
themselves from dead-hand control increase as the world and people's
preferences and expectations change. In the law of trusts, the rule
against perpetuities is the awkward compromise designed to address
these competing pressures. It sets a temporal limit-admittedly
byzantine-on the provisions of a trust.3" As such, it equilibrates the
competing interests of settlors and beneficiaries."'
The rule against perpetuities is a rule no modern theory should
emulate, but it nevertheless provides a useful outline for viewing the
competing pressures in entrenchment.' Interpreting it broadly, it
311 Gregory Alexander refers to the choice as one of "naked preference." Alexander,
37 Stan L Rev at 1193 (cited in note 302), citing Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 Colum L Rev 1689 (1984).
312 See, for example, Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 Hofstra L Rev 763,
789-91 (2009) ("[A] decedent's interests (and perhaps the importance of those interests)
decrease over time, while the interests of a living person can increase or decrease over time.").
313 For the definitive treatment of this issue and a proposal giving beneficiaries the right to
terminate perpetual dynasty trusts, see Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, The Rise of the
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L Rev 1303,1327,1341-42 (2003).
314 It is, of course, not a fixed temporal limit, but requires merely that contingent interests
either vest or fail within the perpetuities period (twenty-one years from the death of a life in
being at the time of the conveyance).
315 Cy pres provides a good example of an ex post de-entrenching mechanism that could
also serve as a valuable analogy. See Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U
Cin L Rev 1307,1310 (2010).
316 It is also a rule in transition. Despite the rule's durability, the American Law Institute has
recently adopted a new restatement of donative transfers that quite fundamentally transforms the
rule against perpetuities. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
§ 27.1, comment a (Tentative Draft no 6 2010).
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stands as an outer bound on dead-hand control, recognizing that the
benefits of restricting the future decrease as time passes, and that the
costs inevitably increase. Notice, then, that the competing interests of
testators and beneficiaries are not necessarily locked in a zero-sum
game. The rule against perpetuities thus aims toward the goal of
maximizing the value of alienability-protecting the testator's
freedom when it is more valuable to her, but eventually protecting the
beneficiaries' control over the property when it becomes more
valuable to them.
The nature of the inquiry in trusts and estates is not whether
dead-hand control is permissible, but instead how much dead-hand
control to permit. The same is true of entrenchment. As this Article
has demonstrated, entrenchment is not static or some singular feature
of government actions that either is present or not. Instead,
entrenchment exists on a spectrum.3 All government actions are
entrenching to some extent. The real inquiry, then, is how much
entrenchment to permit.
V. RECALBRATING ENTRENCHMENT PROTECTION
Having identified the ubiquity of entrenchment through private
law, the forms it takes and the protections in place, and the costs and
benefits that it can create, this Part offers some tentative prescriptions.
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that no single
legal rule can respond adequately to the problem of entrenchment.
The extent to which governments should be allowed to bind the future
depends on the benefits the government is trying to create, the costs at
stake to the future, and whether political malfunctions are likely to
distort how governments compare them. This cannot be assessed in
the abstract. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop an overall
conceptual framework for evaluating entrenchment, and then to apply
it to some particularly contested and evolving areas of law.
A. The Limits of Entrenchment
When are government precommitments too entrenching? That
question framed the beginning of this Article, but it can now be
restated: What are the precommitments that every government will
want the power to make, and what are the policy restrictions that no
government should want to inherit?
It is important to have modest expectations about the content of
any specific conclusion. One problem is that many government
317 See text accompanying notes 9-10.
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decisions are like forks in the road, and each path is entrenching.
Building out infrastructure to a certain capacity is a physically
entrenched growth control, but not investing in infrastructure might
have an even stronger entrenching effect. Opening a municipal
hazardous waste facility might be physically entrenching (for
centuries), but forgoing that income stream might impose an equally
tight financial straitjacket on the future. Both action and inaction can
be entrenching, and building up procedural hurdles and ex ante
prohibitions in these situations may not prevent entrenchment, but
may instead simply shift it to a different form. It would put a thumb
on the scale of inaction instead of action, which can also constrain the
future.
A related problem is that the difference between an entrenching
government action and a de-entrenching one is often just temporal
perspective. A government that incurs pension liabilities shifts
payment obligations on to the future. But if a subsequent government
seeks to de-entrench those obligations-through bankruptcy or some
other form-that will make it far more difficult for subsequent
governments to induce reliance by public employees, presumably
translating into some combination of higher wages and less qualified
employees. Current discussions of municipal pension liabilities often
include an implicit criticism of earlier governments for making
unaffordable precommitments. But reversing those precommitments
creates its own costs for future governments, whose employment
promises are then worth less. There is a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-
you-don't aspect to the entrenchment problem in such situations. The
only absolute certainty is that, no matter what, governments will
continue to guess wrong about the future.
Fundamentally, though, public entrenchment is a problem
because of the opportunity for intertemporal cost shifting. As
examined in Part IV, a government that simply guesses wrong about
the future occupies a position no different from private actors making
bad bets."' The need for de-entrenching mechanisms increases with
the likelihood that a government is discounting-or even
anticipatorily rejecting-the interests of future generations."'
Importantly, though, all government actions present that risk to some
extent. It is all but impossible to distinguish between a bad guess
about the future and a decision that is at least partly the result of
ignoring the interests of the future.
318 See text accompanying notes 278-79.
319 See text accompanying notes 264,288, and 290.
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The outer limits of entrenchment now begin to take shape. As a
first pass, governments' power to preclude subsequent policy changes
should be as limited as possible. Private precommitments that are
immune from change look functionally equivalent to unrepealable
legislation. No matter the strength of a subsequent government's
preferences, no matter how badly it wants to change, such private
precommitments lock in the preferences of the past. On the other side,
every government will want some capacity to induce at least some
private reliance. A world without binding contracts or vested rights
would be an unappealing legal quicksand of instability and flux. In
general, then, de-entrenching mechanisms should be available
whenever possible, but should not be too easy for subsequent
governments to exercise.
Of course, some government actions cannot be undone, and they
are not necessarily inappropriate because of it. Entrenchment through
physical destruction is a good example. There are times when
governments should permit destruction-and indeed times when they
must-and the only choice is between which resource to destroy.
Where de-entrenching tools like eminent domain are not available, ex
ante protections should be in place, either prohibiting an entrenching
action in the first place or at least imposing significant procedural
protections to minimize the risks of political malfunction.
This is not a call for the strongest possible form of anti-
entrenchment protection in every case, however. Entrenchment
protection itself is not free. Instead, entrenchment should be calibrated
to generate the most benefit at the least cost. Conceptually, public
precommitments should be enforced to an extent that maximizes their
net benefits, bearing in mind both the benefits of reliance and the
potential costs imposed on future governments. This implicates a
complex interaction between procedural protections and ex post de-
entrenching mechanisms.
The lower the likelihood of political failure-either because of
procedural protections or because of the local political context-the
less the need for substantive entrenchment protection. Indeed, in the
absence of any risk of political malfunction, there would be no reason
to treat governments differently from private actors. But procedural
protections can be very expensive. They consume money, time, and
limited voter attention, and even at their most robust will never entirely
eliminate the possibility of government decisionmakers discounting or
ignoring the future. At the same time, de-entrenching mechanisms
preserve future flexibility but impose costs of their own, principally
from the diminished ability to generate reliance on government
precommitments. Adjusting the strength of de-entrenching tools will
determine the extent of those costs.
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The actual costs and benefits at stake cannot be determined in
the abstract. The following sections therefore demonstrate how
entrenchment could be calibrated in specific contexts. The examples
that follow are simply examples, and the analysis is illustrative instead
of definitive. People may well disagree with some of the animating
empirical claims and intuitions. Nevertheless, disagreements on those
grounds simply help to identify where subsequent work should focus
to calibrate entrenchment differently.
B. Vested Rights and Eminent Domain
Vested development rights are a useful case study for calibrating
entrenchment protection.320 Vested rights confer important benefits in
the form of third-party reliance. The opportunity to vest development
rights may induce developers to buy into a municipality and then to
make efficient investment decisions without the distorting effect of
some threatened regulatory change. On the other hand, the stronger
the vested rights, the harder it is for a subsequent government to
decide that property should not be developed, or to otherwise adopt
different development and land use policies. Of course, the strength of
the vested right depends fundamentally on how easy it is for a
subsequent government to remove. Eminent domain is the principal
mechanism for de-entrenching vested rights, and adjusting
compensation is the most straightforward way of calibrating its
strength.
If eminent domain is very expensive for subsequent governments
to undertake, an owner will be more willing to rely on her vested
development rights.321 This is true both because the government is
unlikely to seize the rights in the first place-the cost is too high-and
because, if the government does take them, then the owner will be
well compensated. Conversely, if eminent domain becomes too cheap,
then it will be harder to induce reliance on the development rights.
Developers holding weakly protected development rights might
inefficiently race to develop their property or might simply forgo
altogether buying into a community.32
Adjusting compensation also affects the costs of entrenchment.
The more future governments have to pay, the less flexibility they have
to prevent development on the site. Alternatively, if compensation is
320 See Part II.B.
321 It may well be that reliance on vested development rights means having the confidence
to not develop, allowing the developer to take her time and not race to lock in a particular use.
See Serkin, 84 NYU L Rev at 1278-79 (cited in note 81).
322 David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U Pa L Rev 655,
668-95 (1995) (describing race to invest).
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sufficiently inexpensive, governments can change course quite easily,
subject, of course, to political costs, considered below.3 " Cheap liability
rule protection therefore means that entrenchment imposes relatively
few intertemporal costs on future governments, but also generates few
benefits from third-party reliance.
The correlative nature of these costs and benefits does not
necessarily make the project of calibrating entrenchment futile. First,
private parties may not need to be fully insured against the risk of
regulatory change to be induced to rely on vested development rights.
A risk-averse developer may well demand some form of protection
against eminent domain, for example, but-given the shape of typical
indifference curves -may not need to be made fully whole to generate
most of the benefits of vested rights. That is, protection from a
significant wipeout (say, the first $500,000 of compensation) is more
important to a risk-averse owner than protection of the full value of
the property (say, the last $500,000).
Conversely, governments are likely to be relatively insensitive to
the costs of eminent domain up to a point, after which their
responsiveness will rise dramatically. For some government actors, it
may be that fiscal costs do not translate directly into political costs
below a certain threshold, but that their salience increases
significantly as the financial cost goes up. In other words, a local
official may be relatively indifferent to a $100,000 tab but paralyzed
by a $1 million one, and the change between the two is stepwise, not
linear. Or it may just be that local government actors are also risk
averse, and so the prospect of a significant loss is disproportionately
greater than the prospect of a small one.32 Whatever the cause,
whenever this is true, the harm of lock-in will increase
disproportionately at the higher ends of compensation. That is to say,
the most significant entrenching effects will often come at higher
levels of compensation.
Theoretically, then, compensation should be set to maximize the
net benefits of entrenchment, which means permitting entrenchment
to the point that each additional dollar in compensation creates less
benefit in third-party reliance than harm to future governments. More
colloquially, you can increase the size of the pie by making it
323 See note 325 and accompanying text.
324 See Serkin, 81 NYU L Rev at 1666-68 (cited in note 39). Much academic literature
assumes that governments are entirely risk neutral. See, for example, Loren Brandt, Hongbin Li,
and Joanne Roberts, Banks and Enterprise Privatization in China, 21 J L, Econ, & Org 524, 528
(2005); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand L Rev 115,151 (2003); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 29 J Legal Stud 1037,1042 n 13 (2000).
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expensive, but not too expensive, for the government to change
course.
The exclusive focus on compensation here obviously disguises the
enormous complexity in determining the full costs to a future
government of exercising a de-entrenching mechanism like eminent
domain. Compensation's effect on political opposition is dynamic, so
that lower compensation, in some cases, might increase the political
costs of eminent domain if it causes condemnees to lobby harder to
resist government actions."' At the very least, the sensitivity of
government actors to fiscal costs will vary depending on the size and
character of the government. Some government actors are likely to be
326
insensitive to fiscal costs, and others quite the opposite. But the
general point remains: in many situations, offering less than complete
protection can maximize the overall benefit of many government
precommitments, at least from the perspective of entrenchment.
Notice that this offers some important lessons for eminent
domain. It is by now a routine complaint that condemnation awards
fail to compensate owners fully for the loss of their property.27 Just
compensation, measured by a property's fair market value, does not
generally compensate for consequential damages and subjective
value."
Those who have defended current compensation practices usually
do so on either administrative or practical grounds. They argue that
additional damages are either too hard or costly to measure, or they
worry about the deterrent effect on government actions if the
government is required to pay higher compensation.' Entrenchment,
however, provides an important theoretical justification for less than
full compensation, at least in some cases. The entrenchment calculus
calls for balancing the ability to induce reliance on government
325 See Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:An Economic
Analysis, 72 Cal L Rev 569,591-92 (1984).
326 See Serkin, 81 NYU L Rev at 1668 (cited in note 39).
327 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich St L Rev 957, 958-59
(identifying the "uncompensated increment"); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value:
Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw U L Rev 677, 700-01 (2005)
(describing approaches to compensation); Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of
Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City 1990-2002, 39 J Legal
Stud 201, 226 (2010) (finding that compensation is generally below fair market value). But see
Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 UC Davis L Rev 239,244 (2007)
(suggesting that the just compensation standard need not provide full compensation).
328 See Serkin, 99 Nw U L Rev at 734 (cited in note 327). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 Mich L Rev 101, 121-23 (2006) (finding
enhanced compensation under a federal statute providing relocation assistance for displaced
property owners), citing Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Properties Acquisition Act,
Pub L No 91-646,84 Stat 1894, codified as amended at 42 USC § 4630 (1971).
329 Serkin, 99 Nw U L Rev at 705-06 (cited in note 327).
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precommitments on the one hand, with preserving future flexibility on
the other. In the face of these competing goals, and assuming
something less than perfect ex ante procedural protection, the optimal
outcome may often be something short of full compensation!"
Focusing on the de-entrenching role of eminent domain also casts
a new light on recent efforts at eminent domain reform. Following the
Supreme Court's controversial 2005 decision in Kelo, most states have
adopted new limits on local governments' power to take property."'
Some measures have been cosmetic, but others have been quite
restrictive.1' Eminent domain is less available today than it was even a
few years ago.
The problem, fundamentally, is that debates over eminent domain
reform have focused on the impact of condemnation only on private
property. 3  Typically, states have tried to rebalance governments'
power to assemble property with owners' property rights. This has
largely overlooked the important structural role that eminent domain
can play in limiting the temporal reach of government actions. In
other words, through sheer lack of attention, eminent domain reform
has significantly limited a core de-entrenching mechanism. Ignoring
this consequence may make once-routine government actions-like
the sale of municipal property, or the granting of a franchise or
license -inappropriately entrenching because the actions are now
much more difficult for subsequent governments to undo.
This is not to suggest that entrenchment concerns are or should
be the central justification for eminent domain. There are many values
besides entrenchment at stake. However, ignoring the effect of
eminent domain reform on government entrenchment undervalues
eminent domain's key role in preserving flexibility into the future.
330 See text accompanying note 327. This is even more so given the political costs of
eminent domain, no matter how small the fiscal costs. See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 77 (cited
in note 170) (discussing the "due process costs" of eminent domain); Christopher Serkin and
Nelson Tebbe, Condemning Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics of Eminent Domain, 85 Notre
Dame L Rev 1, 34 (2009).
331 See Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform
Legislation Since Kelo, online at http-1/castlecoalition.org/about/component/content
12412?task=view (visited Jan 12, 2011) (surveying legislative changes). See, for example, Mich
Comp Laws § 213.23 (2011); Minn Stat § 117.025 (2010).
332 For a review, see Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2113-16 (cited in note 14).
333 See id at 2101 (noting that forty-three states have enacted post-Kelo reform legislation
to curb eminent domain).
334 See id at 2120.
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C. Breach of Contract and Development Agreements
A similar analysis applies to breach of contract. Under a variety
of doctrines, governments can frequently avoid contractual obligations
by paying less than what private parties would have to pay. As with
just compensation for eminent domain, these reduced damages
awards find surprising justification in entrenchment concerns.
In procurement contracts, for example, multiyear contracts are
always subject to the availability and appropriation of funds in the
future."' That is to say, a subsequent government can always choose
not to appropriate money to fund the procurement contract. Similarly,
governments are required to include a "termination for convenience"
clause in procurement contracts, allowing them to cancel the contract
unilaterally."6 When governments fail to include one expressly, courts
will often imply one.337 In both cases, the government is not entirely off
the hook. It will have to pay for the reasonable value of any costs
incurred, but it need not pay for the full performance value of the
contract.3 3 ' A government breaching a procurement contract is
generally liable for reliance, not expectation damages. 3 "
Importantly, this may be all that is necessary to maximize the
value of many government contracts, especially given a significant risk
335 Consider Model Procurement Code § 3-503(1) (ABA 2000). The commentary to the
2000 revisions states that the revisions "are intended to clarify that multi-year contracts are a
common method of procurement, and that contract durations need not be tied exclusively to
fiscal years." Model Procurement Code § 3-503, comment 1.
336 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 164-65 (cited in note 67) ("Indeed, despite their
apparent similarity to commercial contracts, procurement contracts consistently favor
government in a number of ways, by permitting termination for convenience, for example, and by
limiting the remedies available to private contractors in the event of government breach.");
McConnell, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 308 (cited in note 5) ("Every procurement contract entered
by the federal government contains a 'termination for convenience' clause."). Procurement
contracts are also subject to enormously detailed ex ante procedural requirements. Because
these involve the selection of a private contractor, and not the procedures for determining
whether to undertake the policy in the first place, these are not usefully construed as anti-
entrenchment devices.
337 See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand L Rev 1529,
1567 n 150 (1992), citing G.L. Christian and Associates v United States, 312 F2d 418 (Ct Cl 1963)
and United States v Corliss Steam-Engine Co, 91 US 321 (1875). See also 64 Am Jur 2d Public
Works and Contracts § 163 (2001) (finding that courts are willing to imply termination for a
convenience clause as matter of procurement policy). But see Torncello v United States,
681 F2d 756, 772 (Ct Cl 1982) (refusing to enforce termination for a convenience clause where
no contingency arose subsequent to the government's entering into the contract).
338 In theory, reliance damages and expectation damages can be the same. But reliance
damages here are computed by looking only at what the private party has actually spent. See text
accompanying note 339.
339 Model Procurement Code § 3-503(3). See also Abraham L. Wickelgren, Damages for Breach
of Contract Should the Government Get Special Treatment?,17 J L,Econ, & Org 121,134 (2001).
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of political malfunction."o Again, some level of compensation is
undoubtedly needed to encourage risk-averse counterparties to
contract with governments in the first place. It is hard to imagine how
a government could function without the ability to enter into some
binding and enforceable contracts. But it may not have to pay full
expectation damages for breach in order to secure most of the
available contractual benefits. When private parties contract, of
course, the law generally defers to their judgments about the extent of
the precommitments they want to make and imposes a level of
damages that will theoretically allow parties to maximize the value of
their contracts."' But the possibility of political malfunction on the
front end-imposing a disproportionate share of the costs of the
contract on the future-means that governments should, in many
cases, have more opportunities than private parties to change course.
Entrenchment concerns therefore justify the lower damage awards
that often apply to government contracts.
This analysis also raises a new concern about development
agreements, which have gained both academic and political favor as a
tool for attracting development."' The specific benefits are obvious.
Developers of large projects are understandably skittish about making
significant investments in property-such as developing infrastructure
or developing the first phases of a multiphase project-if there is a
risk that the government will subsequently become inhospitable to the
developers' long-term plans.M3 The threat of zoning changes, increased
fees, or other demands can make a developer wary about investing in
the first place.'" Local governments can decrease those investment
340 See Hadfield, 8 S Cal Interdisc L J at 532 (cited in note 51) (concluding on economic
and moral grounds that government liability for breach of contract should be limited to reliance
damages).
341 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 Colum L Rev 554,558 (1977) ("As long as the compensation adequately mirrors the value of
performance, this damage rule is 'efficient.' It induces a result superior to performance, since one
party receives the same benefits as performance while the other is able to do even better.");
Hanna Chung, Comment, Smaller Exchanges; Larger Regimes: How Trading in Small,
Interdependent Units Affects Treaty Stability, 10 Chi J Intl L 825,836 (2010) ("[C]ontract damages
focus on forcing the breacher to internalize the costs to the aggrieved party, so that the breacher
only breaches when it is equal or better for both parties to the contract.").
342 See Frank, 42 Ind L Rev at 241-42 (cited in note 58); Callies and Tappendorf, 51 Case W
Res L Rev at 665 (cited in note 59); Schwartz, 28 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 720 (cited in note 80).
343 See Armentano, 28 Real Est L J at 259 (cited in note 79):
The development process can be long, difficult, and costly. Developers often must incur
substantial expenses before they can be assured that they will be able to complete their
projects. Changes in local government officials, revisions to applicable zoning rules, and
community opposition all can affect the destiny of a particular project.
344 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 902 (cited in note 248).
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risks in a variety of ways, but one of the most powerful and direct is to
enter into a development agreement, providing an enforceable
promise not to modify the regulatory treatment of property for some
fixed amount of time into the future.
Unlike other government contracts, however, development
agreements can sometimes be enforceable through specific
performance.i' This is likely to be more protection than developers
need and may therefore be unnecessarily entrenching." Offering
compensation in the event of regulatory change will provide
protection, too, while leaving a subsequent government greater
freedom to change course. As a general matter, it is difficult to see
why development agreements should be enforced through specific
performance instead of damages. In many, if not most, cases, the latter
should be enough, and could more appropriately and carefully
balance the developer's need for certainty with the government's need
for flexibility.3 47
D. The Public Trust and Inalienable Powers Doctrines
The public trust doctrine is one of the principal sources of
substantive ex ante entrenchment protection. Its contours are
notoriously ambiguous. The Supreme Court identified a federal floor
in Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois,3 4 ' famously invalidating the
conveyance of a significant portion of the Chicago harbor to the
Illinois Central Railroad.' The Court found that such navigable
waters were held in trust for the public and that a government
therefore had no power to convey them away. More interesting than
this floor, however, has been the expansion of the public trust doctrine
345 See note 61 and accompanying text.
346 There is, for example, a literature on unrepealable contracts, identifying specific
contractual settings in which the availability of efficient breach (or ex post liability rule
protection more generally) diminishes the joint benefits the parties could otherwise have
expected to receive. See, for example, Davis, 81 NYU L Rev at 494 (cited in note 274) (discussing
scenarios where "in order to induce efficient behavior at an early stage in their relationship ('ex
ante') the parties must sign a contract that commits them to behaving inefficiently at a later
stage ('ex post')").
347 This will depend on the value of the development, elasticity in regional property
markets (that is, the availability of substitutable property for the developer), and the
opportunities-available to the government to make substitute concessions, among other factors.
On the other side of the equation, the costs of the development agreement will depend on the
likelihood that a subsequent government will actually want to adopt a different land use
regulation within the period covered by the development agreement. In a small municipality
with little mobility and stable preferences over time, a development agreement may present far
fewer risks than it does in a rapidly growing suburb or urban center.
348 146 US 387 (1892).
349 Id at 463-64.
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in many states. For example, a number of states have expanded it to
apply specifically to environmentally sensitive lands."'o
Entrenchment provides a potential justification for this
expansion. One litmus test should be whether conveying the property
from public to private hands risks destruction of the underlying
resource. Where destruction is at stake, a subsequent government will
not have the opportunity to reacquire the property later-not even
through eminent domain-and the conveyance of the property may
therefore irremediably impoverish the future.' But where destruction
is not a risk, and eminent domain is available as a remedy, expanding
public trust makes much less sense, at least viewed in terms of
entrenchment.
A similar analysis applies to the inalienable powers doctrine.
Conveying away the ability to regulate for the health, safety, and
welfare of the public is like selling core public trust property; the threat
it poses to the future is generally too great to permit. Entrenchment
analysis, however, highlights the importance of allowing governments to
indemnify private parties for the costs of regulatory change. Ex post
property rules, or ex post applications of the inalienable powers
doctrine, make it difficult -sometimes prohibitively difficult-for a
government to induce reliance on its precommitments. Developers and
investors may not need promises of future regulatory treatment to be
specifically enforceable, but they may require a secure promise of
compensation for future adverse decisions.
Entrenchment also provides an additional justification for the rule
that the power of eminent domain is itself inalienable.' A government
cannot give up its power to condemn property. As applied to eminent
domain, the inalienable powers doctrine preserves future flexibility both
directly and indirectly: directly by preventing governments from handing
over their regulatory power, and indirectly by preserving eminent
domain as a de-entrenching mechanism for future governments.
E. Financial Entrenchment
As described in Part II, municipal governments have found
increasingly sophisticated ways to avoid substantive debt limits and
350 See Craig, 16 Penn St Envir L Rev at 20-21 (cited in note 220) (cataloguing the public
trust doctrine in eastern states).
351 Public trust undoubtedly serves other goals as well. A government may well have an
interest in preventing the kinds of collective action problems that can result from fractionated
ownership of navigable waterways, for example. See Heller, Gridlock Economy at 26 (cited in
note 223).
352 See, for example, West River Bridge Co v Dix, 47 US (6 How) 507, 531-32 (1848). See
also Sterk,88 Colum L Rev at 672-73 (cited in note 52) (describing the doctrine).
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bond election requirements." Admittedly, it may be that these are
changes for the good. At its best, municipal debt is actually a solution
to a different kind of intertemporal externality problem. Certain
investments that a local government undertakes will create positive
externalities into the future, and debt simply aligns costs and benefits.
Infrastructure development, for example, may require a significant
upfront payment but create benefits for years. A government's
floating a municipal bond to fund infrastructure development, then,
allocates to the future the obligation to pay a fair share of the cost of
the infrastructure, given the intertemporal dispersion of benefits."' Or,
to put it differently, some kinds of investments create positive
externalities into the future. Without some mechanism for spreading
those costs into the future, too, governments may make too few such
investments."'
The problem, of course, is the difficulty of determining up front
whether the investments really are going to create positive benefits
into the future, either because plans pan out badly-as with railroad
investments in the nineteenth century"'-or because future
preferences are different. And there is always a chance that municipal
debt reflects nothing more than a power grab, an effort to co-opt
future income to make cash available today. People have therefore
long understood the need for some kinds of constraints on municipal
debt in order to prevent a government from mortgaging the future.'
The extensive, even if ultimately porous, limits on municipal debt
make the contrast with other forms of financial entrenchment all the
more striking. It is increasingly clear that the tools of municipal
finance have outstripped legal protections against entrenchment.
There are, for example, effectively no limits on a government's ability
353 See Part I.C.
354 This is the theoretical justification for the rule that self-liquidating debt used to finance
income-producing assets will not be included in municipal debt limits. See note 229 and
accompanying text.
355 How governments actually internalize costs and benefits is the subject of ongoing
academic controversy. See, for example, Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U Chi L Rev 345,350-52 (2000). While the
mechanisms are undoubtedly complex, the claim here is simply that some kinds of projects
generate such substantial intertemporal benefits that governments are likely to underinvest in
them without some way of either spreading the cost over time or capturing those benefits.
356 See text accompanying notes 128-30.
357 See Sterk and Goldman, 1991 Wis L Rev at 1302 (cited in note 128) (arguing that
constitutional debt limits have generally worked well). But see Gillette, 86 Denver U L Rev
at 1257-58 (cited in note 225) (arguing that credit markets work better at constraining
governments than formal limits).
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to sell assets."" A government can radically impoverish the future by
selling off future income streams."9 Even more problematically,
whatever constraints credit markets impose on municipal debt do not
apply to the sale of assets; purchasers of municipal assets have little
stake in future governments' ability to meet their financial obligations.
If anything, then, there is greater need for protection against
some of these alternative forms of financial entrenchment than from
traditional municipal debt. Here, recommendations are necessarily
tentative, at best, but entrenchment analysis at least suggests some
ways of thinking about the problem.
As with municipal debt, there are opportunities for imposing ex
ante requirements before monetizing an income-producing asset. It is
possible to imagine special election requirements, akin to bond
election requirements, and substantive limits on the sale of assets
valued above a certain percentage of local assessed property values.
Of course, it is difficult to predict whether the protection that these
measures provide would be worth their considerable cost, especially
given how easily governments circumvent them in the context of
municipal debt." For purposes of this discussion, the form of the
protection is much less important than recognizing the role that ex
ante requirements can play in protecting against financial
entrenchment.
This Article's analysis also suggests a broader range of options,
however. To the extent that the concern is about burdens on the
future, solutions can occur either ex ante or ex post. The principal de-
entrenching mechanism for financial entrenchment is bankruptcy, but
its utility for local governments has traditionally been quite limited."'
States have been loath to authorize a municipality to enter
bankruptcy, and governments themselves perceive enormous costs to
doing so.6 As a result, bankruptcy-like eminent domain-is
sometimes more theoretically than practically available. Perhaps that
should change.
358 There are some statutory requirements about open bidding that are geared to solving
the intrageneration principal-agent problem, but nothing that limits a government's ability to
decide whether to sell the assets in the first place.
359 Julie Roin offers a more detailed and also more nuanced version of this same criticism.
See Roin, 95 Minn L Rev at 2001-10 (cited in note 64).
360 Alternatively, David Super has endorsed a rule that governments should be required to
ignore the proceeds from asset sales when reconciling their budgets, as happens with the federal
government. Super, 118 Harv L Rev at 2628 (cited in note 62) ("This rule does not prevent the
current majority from selling off public assets to the detriment of future legislators, but it does
prevent budget rules from providing an incentive to do so.").
361 For a discussion of bankruptcy, see Part III.C.
362 See note 195.
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The greater the availability of a de-entrenching mechanism like
bankruptcy, the less valuable the government precommitment is on
the front end. This is an important tradeoff, evident in eminent
domain and breach of contract as well. If it becomes easier for a
government to discharge its debt in bankruptcy, then it will be harder
to get third parties to extend credit, making municipal debt more
expensive for governments. But it may well be that a meaningful
threat of bankruptcy would force lenders and other counterparties-
including labor unions representing municipal employees-to exert
some ex ante discipline against financially entrenching actions.
Bankruptcy provisions are also sufficiently protective of creditor
interests that credit is unlikely to become unmanageably expensive or
inaccessible, even if Chapter 9 were more readily available. In fact, it
might actually enhance the constraining function of credit markets,
which would presumably look beyond the formal categories of
municipal transactions to their substantive effect on the government's
creditworthiness. Calibrating the protection requires empirical work,
but thinking about the problem in terms of entrenchment both reveals
the commonality between municipal debt and other forms of financial
entrenchment and suggests common solutions that can operate either
ex ante or ex post.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that local governments frequently make
decisions, adopt policies, or otherwise take steps that significantly
restrict the options available to future governments. Cataloguing them
suggests a continuum of entrenchment and reveals deep connections
between otherwise disparate-seeming areas of law. These forms of
entrenchment, from contractual to physical and in between, combine
to form a strong set of tools for affecting the future. Simultaneously,
anti-entrenchment protection, in the form of outright prohibitions, ex
ante procedural requirements, and ex post de-entrenching
mechanisms, usually prevent the worst consequences of entrenchment
while still allowing governments to capture the benefits of making
precommitments binding into the future.
Ultimately, then, these forms of entrenchment, combined with
various anti-entrenchment rules and doctrines, describe a complex
balance between stability and flexibility. And they reveal that, in the
abstract, entrenchment is neither good nor bad. Instead, entrenchment
must be viewed in terms of the relative costs and benefits it creates,
with special attention to the likelihood of political malfunction in
various contexts. What emerges is a relatively nuanced set of tools in
existing law that appear surprisingly well tailored to capturing the
benefits of entrenchment while protecting the future.
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This happy story has been changing, however, as local governments
have become increasingly adept at circumventing anti-entrenchment
protections. New and creative ways of financing public goods and
services, alienating property, and precommitting to land use regimes all
avoid the important safeguards that apply to more traditional forms of
entrenchment. Simultaneously, limits on eminent domain threaten to
contract an important structural safeguard that has traditionally been
the anti-entrenchment backstop. Imposing these profound limits on
eminent domain and other doctrines without carefully considering the
effects on entrenchment is likely to result in a pronounced shift in
democratic power from the future to the present -a shift that may turn
out to be unduly costly in the end.
